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EXPLAINING ADA EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CHARGES
OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE
ChristopherL. Griffin, Jr.*
Abstract
Economists and legal scholars have long debated
what effects, if any, the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) generatedfor people with disabilities.
Empirical studies usually focus on the employerside impact of Title I, which prohibits adverse
workplace decisions with respect to hiring,
termination, and conditions of employment, and
that literature has produced decidedly mixed
findings. Largely missing from the conversation,
however, has been an employee-focused account,
one that describes when and why employees seek
legal relief under Title L This Article addresses
that deficiency by analyzing the submission of
every ADA Title I charge to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) between 1992
and 2011 as a function of the unemployment rate,
political economy factors, state disability
protection law, and disability type. Using statelevel panel data, I first show that a percentage
point increase in the unemployment rate is
associated with about 30% more charge
submissions. Employees with disabilities are
therefore more likely to file discrimination claims
during recessionaryperiods, which causes the ADA
to resemble an informal unemployment insurance
mechanism.
Second, the success rate is
ambiguously tied to the unemployment rate.
Depending on the definition of success, the data
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suggest that charges submitted during recessionary
periods tend to find less purchase at the EEOC.
With respect to political economy explanations,
states with Republican-controlled legislatures
produce fewer Title I charges, but the statistical
evidence is fairly weak. More interestingly, the
opposite is true for states that enacted ADA-like
Finally, no discernible
statutes before 1990.
activity emerge
charge
differences in EEOC
according to the charging party's disability type.
The Article concludes with a few research
implications and policy recommendations for the
EEOC and employers to address the employment of
people with disabilitiesover the business cycle.
INTRODUCTION

After a quarter century, one of the few consensus conclusions about
the Americans with Disabilities Act 1 (ADA) is, paradoxically, the level
of disagreement about its everyday impact. Some have lauded it as a
2
civil rights beacon for people with disabilities. Critical perspectives
range from merely disappointed3 to much less sanguine. 4 Enforcement
difficulties have stymied much of the progress heralded by the ADA's
6
earliest champions. 5 From accessible public accommodations to
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012).
2. See e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct at 25: The Highest
Expression ofAmerican Values, 313 JAMA 2231, 2231 (2015) ("The ADA embodies the highest values
of the United States-a compassionate nation with the vision to unleash the vast potential of persons
with disabilities and to inspire global social change.").
3. See e.g., Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and ImprovedAmericans with DisabilitiesAct:
Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 217, 217 (2008) (citing
Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 58 VAND. L.
REv. 1807, 1812-13 (2005)) ("[T]he ADA is viewed so widely by disability rights advocates and its
original authors as such a huge disappointment, especially in the employment context.").
4. E.g., Mario Loyola & Richard A. Epstein, The Disabling of America, 8 AM. INTEREST,
July/Aug. 2013, at 32, 34 ("It is increasingly clear that, notwithstanding its good intentions, the ADA
takes a counterproductive approach to the problems it is trying to solve. Its economic premises are flatly
mistaken. It fails any rational cost-benefit analysis. And it reveals a philosophy of massive government
interference in ordinary social interaction that is misguided and worrisome.").
5. See Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MiNN. L. REv. 434, 453
(2007) ("[S]trong executive leadership-something that the ADA had at its passage-is needed to shake
public enforcement agencies from their path dependent behaviors. This is especially needed with the
ADA.") (footnotes omitted).
6. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies: The Case of
"Abusive" ADA Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1, 30 (2006) ("The limited remedies have led to massive
underenforcement of the ADA's public accommodations title, and they have left serial litigation as one
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employment opportunities, 7 public agency action and private litigation
have fallen short of the statute's promise. 8 Scholarly attention to the

ADA's early legacy, especially among empiricists, has focused
primarily on whether the law advanced employment outcomes for
people with disabilities. 9 At the time of passage, supporters believed

Title I-banning discrimination in the application, hiring, promotion,
and discharge of persons with disabilities-would yield results akin to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.10 Despite the range of
methodologies, data sets, and findings across empirical studies,
uncertainty reigns. The most one can reliably conclude is that the ADA
on average probably did no harm to employment prospects. 1
Such analyses, helpful as they are to answering fundamental
questions about the statute's labor market effects, ignore the broader

context in which workers with disabilities make use of the law's
guarantees. Prior empirical work has, at best, generated inference about
how the shadow of litigation affects employer decision-making. These

employer-side approaches are traditionally microeconomic in scope
of the only ways to achieve anything approaching meaningful compliance with the statute."); Ruth
Colker, ADA Title III: A Fragile Compromise, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377, 410 (2000)
("Voluntary compliance is difficult to measure, but any casual observation of the accessibility of places
of public accommodation reveals that there is much work to be done in order to attain compliance.").
7. Cf Michael Ashley Stein etal., Cause Lawyeringfor People with Disabilities, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 1658, 1686 (2010) (reviewing SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE
DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2009)) ("While we agree ... that the ADA is underenforced, cause
lawyers have been at the forefront of enforcing the ADA's nonemployment provisions and serve as an
example for what more robust public enforcement can aspire to achieve.").
8. See, e.g., Steven L. Willborn, The Nonevolution of Enforcement Under the ADA: Discharge
Cases and the Hiring Problem, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT 103, 106-09 (Peter David Blanck ed., 2000) (suggesting several reasons why enforcement of ADA
protection might have lagged behind similar efforts under Title VII); Adam A. Milani, Wheelchair
Users Who Lack "Standing":Another ProceduralThresholdBlocking Enforcement of Titles II and I1
of the ADA, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 69 (2004) (discussing how federal standing doctrine hinders
successful pursuit of ADA claims); Louis S.Rulli & Jason A. Leckerman, Unfinished Business: The
Fading Promise of ADA Enforcement in the Federal Courts Under Title I and Its Impact on the Poor,
8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 595, 596 (2005) (exploring "the relationship between enforcement of the
ADA in federal courts and the reasons that the ADA has not, so far, been as successful in opening the
doors of the workplace as many had hoped"). But see Paul Steven Miller, EEOC's Enforcement of the
ADA in the Second Circuit,48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1577 (1998) (arguing that the EEOC had successfully
prosecuted ADA discrimination claims and increased enforcement in the law's first decade).
9. See infra subsection I.B.1.
10. See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 19 (2000) (noting how the ADA was "enacted amid hopes that it
would have a sweeping impact"); Chai R. Feldblum, Employment Protections,69 MILBANK Q. 81, 83
(1991) ("One of the purposes of the ADA was to establish long-awaited parity in federal civil-rights
laws between people with disabilities and other minorities and women. Thus, the procedural
requirements of the ADA ...are drawn from and are essentially equal to those in title VII.").
11. But see Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection?
The Case of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 929-32 (2001) (estimating that
the employment levels of people with disabilities under forty declined after the ADA's effective date).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

3

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 4

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 84

because they center on the partial equilibrium reached between workers
and firm owners. For example, owners might have offered higher wages
on average for people with disabilities after the ADA's effective date.
They would have done so as a rational response to the law's sanctions
for basing relative compensation on disability status. Such decisions
follow more from the strength of the law's prohibitions rather than its
Studying wage and employment outcomes
affirmative guarantees.
therefore only indirectly covers workers' experiences with the statute's
protections. A more direct course would emphasize how and when
persons with disabilities actively rely on the ADA's provisions-how
they call upon the promises of civil rights legislation.
This Article embraces that perspective through an employee-side,
macroeconomic analysis of the decision to submit employment
discrimination charges and poses three empirical questions: (1) What
relationship is there, if any, between business cycle fluctuations and
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge
submissions and success?; (2) Is there a similar relationship between
charge submissions and political economy or legal factors?; and (3) Is
there important variation in charge submission activity by disability
type? Unlike previous work, I find that charge submissions are
decidedly countercyclical-their frequency increases with the
unemployment rate. The results on charge success, however, are more
ambiguous owing to different interpretations of what constitutes a "win"
at the administrative relief stage. I find no discernible connection
between partisan control of state governments and EEOC charge
activity. On the other hand, presidential politics may indirectly correlate
with charges and outcomes through administrative agenda-setting and
the political functions of administrative appointees. I also find that
states with disability employment protection statutes tend to produce
more federal discrimination charges but that charge patterns do not
significantly differ by the charging party's underlying condition.
Unlike work pursuing a causal connection between the ADA's
provisions and the propensity for employer discrimination, I concentrate
on simply understanding in broad terms when employees are more likely
to seek legal recourse for such discrimination. The orientation is
macroeconomic because its primary explanatory variables abstract from
the implicit bargaining that produces wage and employment levels. It
emphasizes how broader economic conditions affect employees'
decisions to vindicate their civil rights. This employee-side perspective
emphasizes individual engagement with antidiscrimination statutes as
the outcome of interest rather than statistics connecting the law to labor
market results. Of course, a complete evaluation of the ADA must
account for changes in wage and hiring outcomes for people with
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disabilities, and these questions have received significant attention in the
literature.1 2 Employment discrimination laws like the ADA, though,
represent a collection of rights and procedures for redressing adverse
Determining how often and under what
employer decisions. 13
circumstances employees with disabilities submit claims for workplace
discrimination is just as important as shifting patterns in their wages
earned and hours worked.
Reorienting toward an employee-charge perspective furthers three
useful empirical objectives. First, as prior studies have shown, 14 the
state of the wider economy can make market-based remedies more
salient than legal ones. On this account, the decision to submit a
discrimination claim should be inversely correlated with the business
In economic parlance, the charge submission rate is
cycle.
countercyclical. In boom periods, workers who believe they were
unlawfully terminated might find ample alternative employment
opportunities. As a result, pursuing monetary or equitable judgment
through the courts declines in importance. But in recessionary years,
dampened labor demand heightens the need for the ADA's protections.
When labor markets are tighter, employment discrimination law
potentially functions as an informal unemployment insurance

mechanism. 15

Second, prior employee-side empirical studies tend to concentrate
solely on complaints filed in federal court and ensuing litigation. The
universe of overall discrimination claims dwarfs this subset of cases. As
others have suggested, vindicating workplace civil rights remains a real
challenge for antidiscrimination law: "The present system may police
12. See, e.g., Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 11; David H. Autor & Mark G. Duggan, The Rise
in the DisabilityRolls and the Decline in Unemployment, 118 Q.J. ECON. 157 (2003); Kathleen Beegle
& Wendy A. Stock, The Labor Market Effects of Disability Discrimination Laws, 38 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 806 (2003); Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 35 J. HUM. RESOURCES 693 (2000) [hereinafter DeLeire, Wage and Employment
Effects]; Thomas DeLeire, The Unintended Consequences of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 23
REG. 21 (2000) [hereinafter DeLeire, Unintended Consequences]; John J. Donohue III etal., Assessing
Post-ADA Employment: Some Econometric Evidence and Policy Considerations,8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 477 (2011).
13. In fact, legislators famously held up the ADA as nothing short of a revolutionary
breakthrough for disability rights. RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 6 (2005) ("Democratic Senator Edward M. Kennedy (Mass.)
heralded the ADA as an 'emancipation proclamation' for people with disabilities; Republican Senator
Orrin Hatch (Utah) called the act 'the most sweeping piece of civil rights legislation possibly in the
history of our country."').
14. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
DiscriminationLitigation, 43 STAN. L. REv. 983 (1991) [hereinafter Donohue & Siegelman, Changing
Nature]; John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, Law and Macroeconomics: Employment
DiscriminationLitigation Over the Business Cycle, 66 S.CAL. L. REV. 709 (1993) [hereinafter Donohue
& Siegelman, Law and Macroeconomics].
15. See Donohue & Siegelman, Law and Macroeconomics,supra note 14, at 710.
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against egregious forms of discrimination, but for many who perceive
themselves to be victims of discrimination, their rights remain
unrealized." 16 For victims of disability discrimination, that system
begins with the EEOC. Before ADA claimants obtain a private right to

sue, they must first exhaust administrative remedies with the
Commission. 17 The set of formal charges still includes all individuals
who believe they experienced unlawful discrimination.
But
understanding the circumstances under which employees with
disabilities pursue legal options-regardless of whether the claim leads
to litigation-sheds light on their engagement with the ADA and
possibly other employment discrimination statutes.
Third, this analysis speaks in part to changing views of disability.
The well-known, yet misplaced distinction between physical and
mental/behavioral conditions affects the ways in which society perceives
individuals as disabled. 18 Persons with salient, outwardly observable
conditions often are presumed to be "truly disabled" relative to people
with psychological disabilities. 19 The ADA's potential implicitly relies
on the notion that obstacles to social integration are independent of
impairment classification. The barriers employees with disabilities face
are, on this account, structural; all such workers face similar headwinds
in the labor market because of employers' biased attitudes about
disabilities. Consistent with this "social model" of disability, my
empirical findings interestingly suggest that the relationship between the

business cycle and invoking legal remedies is independent of one's
disability type.
I develop these arguments in four Parts. Part I briefly explains the

16. Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis of
Employment DiscriminationLitigationas a ClaimingSystem, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 663, 665.
17. See infra subpart I.A.
18. See Jane Byeff Kom, Crazy (Mental Illness Under the ADA),36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 585,
590, 617 (2003) (noting that since at least the times of the early Greeks and Romans, people have
distinguished between mental and physical disabilities and that the distinction is "deeply entrenched in
our legal system"); Susan Stefan, "You'd Have to be Crazy to Work Here ": Worker Stress, the Abusive
Workplace, and Title I of the ADA, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 795, 805 (1998) ("Judicial assumptions about
the nature of psychiatric disabilities and essential employment functions have resulted in the near-total
failure of the ADA to protect individuals with psychiatric disabilities from employment
discrimination.").
19. See Kom, supra note 18, at 640 ("The problem for people with a mental illness in
establishing that they are disabled within the meaning of the ADA is exacerbated by the vision of a
'disability'
that is held by those who enforce the ADA, that a disability is an
observable, physical limitation."); Jeffrey Swanson et al., Justice Disparities: Does TheADA
Enforcement System Treat People with Psychiatric DisabilitiesFairly?, 66 MD. L. REv. 94, 95 (2006)
(finding that "people with psychiatric disabilities fared significantly worse in employment
discrimination lawsuits than their counterparts with non-psychiatric disabilities").
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EEOC charge process and reviews earlier work linking employment
Part II offers
discrimination law to macroeconomic conditions.
preliminary, descriptive evidence for the relationship between the
unemployment rate and charge submissions and success. Part III
employs restricted-use data covering the universe of ADA Title I
charges between 1992 and 2011 to understand the connection between
macroeconomic fundamentals and employment discrimination charges.
The countercyclical estimates comport with previous results on litigation
filings, but not prior analysis of EEOC charges. The preferred estimates
suggest that a percentage point increase in the unemployment rate
increases the amount of EEOC charges by 30%. But the empirical
results also suggest a negative connection between the unemployment
rate and merits determinations favoring the charging party. Using three
indicators of political economy and legal factors-partisan control of
state government, presidential political control, and state-level
employment discrimination laws-I also find some evidence of an
association with EEOC charge patterns. The estimates imply most
clearly that presidential administrations led by Democrats are associated
with more charge submissions. So, too, are states that had passed ADAlike statutes before the federal version. I find no connection, though,
between state experiences with disability employment discrimination
statutes and success in EEOC charge processing. Finally, I survey how
the baseline unemployment rate and merits relationships differ by
disability type. Part IV discusses the empirical findings in the context of
future research as well as policy priorities for both the EEOC and
employers.
I. THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
CHARGE ACTIVITY

This Part explores the procedures for ADA charge submission as well
as theories and related empirical conclusions explaining why and when
submissions arise. Section L.A first summarizes the EEOC charge
process. Section I.B then distinguishes between the employer-side,
microeconomic underpinnings of the ADA and those scanning more
broadly to include structural factors. In particular, it reviews a series of
studies demonstrating a link between macroeconomic conditions and
Title VII litigation, but not EEOC charges. Section I.C supplements
economic indicators with political and legal ones. The idea is that
background features of partisan political influence and state experience
with disability discrimination law can affect the climate in which
employees submit charges as much as macroeconomic indicators.
Section I.D hypothesizes about how one's disability type might affect
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the relationship between the unemployment rate and charge activity.
A. The EEOC Charge HandlingProcess
The ADA vests the EEOC and the U.S. Attorney General with the
"powers, remedies, and procedures" of enforcement under its

employment-related provisions.
In most disability discrimination
cases, however, only the EEOC plays a significant role, just as it does in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and related statutes. Indeed,
authorization for the EEOC appeared in the text of Title VII, 2 1 but the
agency did not possess true enforcement powers-in particular litigation
authority-until eight years later. 2 2 Its role as ADA charge processor
and chief conciliator is equally important. Before an ADA claim
reaches the federal courts, the EEOC serves as fact finder and arbiter.
Those combined tools have served the Commission well since the

ADA's enactment; it "favorably resolved 91% of23 [] cases through
settlement or jury verdict" in the ADA's first decade.

When a disabled employee believes an employer has based a
workplace decision on his or her disability, the employee must first
submit a charge to the EEOC.2 4 This procedural step, which also exists

for the other landmark employment discrimination statutes, simply
requires administrative review before a private right of action will be

recognized.2 5 The charging party may submit a federal charge alongside
a corollary state filing, normally with a Fair Employment Practices
Agency (FEPA).26 The EEOC maintains fifty field offices for charging
parties to report unlawful activity.27 The charge particulars contain only
20. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2012).
21. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (2012).
22. Anne Noel Occhialino & Daniel Vail, Why the EEOC (Still) Matters, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 677-78 (2005).
23. Id.at 686.
24. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.6(a) (2014).
25. This intermediate step furthers at least three important goals the balance the interests of the
charging party, the respondent employer, and the judiciary. It "enables aggrieved individuals to seek
redress for harms suffered, allows employers to resolve workplace disputes earlier and through more
informal means, and helps to reduce the federal court dockets." Occhialino & Vail, supra note 22, at
692.
26. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(3)(i) (2009). These provisions were seemingly designed to avoid
federalism concerns in jurisdictions where FEPAs also had subject matter jurisdiction over employment
discrimination enforcement. Id. ("In order to give full weight to the policy of section 706(c) of title
VII, which affords State and local fair employment practice agencies that come within the provisions of
that section an opportunity to remedy alleged discrimination ...[i]t is the intent of the Commission to
thereby encourage the maximum degree of effectiveness in the State and local agencies.").
27. Kathryn Moss, The ADA Employment Discrimination Charge Process: How Does It Work
and Whom Is It Benefiting?, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES

ACT, supra note 8, at 119.
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the most basic information: the employee's contact information, the
employer's address, a "clear and concise statement of the facts," the
firm's approximate size, and notice of an attendant state filing. 28
The process that follows combines elements of pre-trial discovery and
alternative dispute resolution. EEOC investigators possess subpoena
power and may compel the production of evidence related to the
charge.29 These facts and testimony aid the Commission as it
determines whether there is reasonable cause that an unlawful
employment practice occurred. Once it makes that determination, the
EEOC must promptly notify the charging party and the employer. A
"no cause" finding only signifies that the EEOC did not believe
reasonable cause existed; it is not equivalent to a liability standard at
civil trial. If reasonable cause is found, federal regulations require the
EEOC to "attempt to achieve a just resolution of all violations found and
to obtain agreement that the respondent will eliminate the unlawful
30
employment practice and provide appropriate affirmative relief.
When conciliation fails, the charging party will receive a "right to sue"
letter; charging parties for whom reasonable cause was not found must
receive the same notice within ninety days of determination. 3 1 These
letters create a private right of action, but the EEOC may choose at its
discretion to file suit on behalf of aggrieved employees. The EEOC's
criteria for selecting cases to litigate are numerous, but it tends to bring
suit in cases that would otherwise resemble class actions
or potentially
32
doctrine.
antidiscrimination
of
development
the
affect
The data described below were generated from these procedural
activities. 33 In fact, they combine the information from the charging
party's submission with the Commission's final disposition.
An
understanding of the charge processing system facilitates certain
empirical judgments. For example, distinguishing charges that lead to a
Commission determination from those resolved before the agency issues
a judgment from those that are closed by default will be critical for
defining charging party success. On the other hand, the streamlined
nature of EEOC charge handling limits the amount and type of
information available for analysis. Given this Article's posture-one
investigating statistical relationships short of causal mechanisms-the
charge process data should reflect those relationships reliably.

28. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a) (1977).
29. Id.§§ 1601.15-.16(a).
30. Id. § 1601.24(a).
31. Id.§§ 1601.19(a), 1601.28(b).
32. For a comprehensive discussion of the EEOC's litigation goals, see Occhialino & Vail, supra
note 22, at 700-02.
33. See infra subpart H.A.
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B. Economic Perspectives on Employment Discriminationand
ChargeActivity
The literature examining how antidiscrimination law affects the labor
market has developed along both theoretical and empirical dimensions.
Theoretical work almost exclusively models the equilibrium wages and
hours that result from employer discrimination. Related empirical work
estimates whether these equilibria respond to antidiscrimination
mandates. Together, these approaches constitute the employer-side,
microeconomic approach. A less common avenue, the employee-side
approach, stresses employee incentives to seek redress under
This Section briefly reviews the two
antidiscrimination law.
complementary viewpoints. Although many of the examples herein
probe racial discrimination, the underlying notions apply equally to bias
against people with disabilities.
1. Microeconomic Studies
Most empirical studies on federal employment discrimination law
follow methods developed in the fields of labor economics and
sociology. These studies build upon the microeconomic models of
discrimination pioneered by economists in the mid-20th century.3 4 The
models are microeconomic in scope because they cast outcomes-wages
offered and hours worked-as functions of employer decisions rather
than systemic factors. An early, central economic insight held that
discrimination reflected supposedly profit-maximizing firms actually
making altogether inefficient decisions. 35 Kenneth Arrow styled the
racial wage discrimination quandary as follows: "If the members of the
two races, after adjusting for observable differences in human capital
and the like, received different wages or were charged different prices in
commodity or credit markets, an arbitragepossibility would be created
In other words,
which would be wiped out by competition. 36
discrimination should not persist because the market will eliminate the
deadweight loss created by animus-driven employers.
34. The foundational studies centered on race-based discrimination. See, e.g., GARY BECKER,
THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971); Kenneth J. Arrow, Models of Job Discrimination,
in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 83 (A.H. Pascal ed., 1972); Kenneth J. Arrow, The

Theory of Discrimination,in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS 3 (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees
eds., 1973); Edmund S.Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 659
(1972). See generally John J. Donohue, Antidiscrimination Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 1387, 1394-1417 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (considering the
leading economic theories of discrimination).
35. See Donohue, supra note 34, at 1396-99 (explaining the Beckerian model of discrimination).
36. Kenneth J. Arrow, What Has Economics to Say About Racial Discrimination?, 12 J. ECON.
PERSP. 91, 94 (1998) (emphasis added).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol84/iss3/4

10

Griffin: Explaining ADA Employment Discrimination Charges Over the Busines

2016]

ADA CHARGES OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE

Antidiscrimination law, on this account, nudges firm owners toward
efficient outcomes by outlawing biased employment choices or selection
procedures. 37 Efficiency usually follows either the Pareto or KaldorHicks variation, whereby the only choices that would make some better
off would inevitably reduce the welfare

of others. 3 8

Efficient

employment decisions lead to additional hiring or reduced firing of
workers with disabilities up to the point where the cost of providing
accommodations to the marginal worker equals the benefit of retaining
him/her. At this equilibrium point, employers no longer indulge their
"taste for discrimination," 39 if they have one.

They must treat all

potential hires or current employees equally without regard for protected
characteristics. If so, the only permissible variation in the incidents of
employment would be a function of productivity, experience, and

human capital accumulation (e.g., education). Later empirical studies
eventually cast doubt on the strength of that efficiency argument,

showing that minority workers suffered substantial, exclusionary
discrimination before the 1960s.40 They effectively made the case for

antidiscrimination law as a vital antidote to market failure.4 '

The dominant micro-empirical approach to assessing the ADA's

impact asks whether the law measurably enhanced labor market
outcomes by absorbing the under- or unemployed disabled labor force.
The basic methodology uses a "difference-in-differences" or "tripledifferences" setup.42 The former method (1) calculates the average
change in an employment-related outcome before and after the law's

effective date (the first difference) and (2) subtracts that difference for
workers without disabilities from the same difference for those with
37. See Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of DisabilityAccommodations, 53 DUKE
L.J. 79, 159-67 (2003) (discussing ways in which the ADA "cure[s] the information asymmetry causing
individual employers to suffer from market failures" by generating "a quasi-voluntary, wholly efficient,
Pareto optimal equilibrium").
38. See Jules L. Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare, 112 YALE L.J. 1511, 1515-17 (2003)
(reviewing LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002) and summarizing

the definitions of each measurement and the differences between the two).
39. See BECKER, supra note 34, at 16-17.
40. See, e.g., James J. Heckman & Brook S. Payner, Determining the Impact of Federal
AntidiscriminationPolicy on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of South Carolina,79 AM. ECON.
REV. 138 (1989).
41. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & James Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The
Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J. ECON. LIT. 1603, 1637-40 (1991)
(calling for a nuanced view of civil rights law in which federal policy led to sustained improvements in
labor market outcomes for racial minorities).
42. For a primer on the difference-in-differences methodology, see Joshua D. Angrist & Alan B.
Krueger, EmpiricalStrategies in Labor Economics, in 3A HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS, 1277,
1293-99 (Orley C. Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999). A similar textbook treatment for tripledifferences strategies appears in MYOUNG-JAE LEE, MICRO-ECONOMETRICS FOR POLICY, PROGRAM,

AND TREATMENT EFFECTS 111-16 (2005).
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A third dimension might add

differences by state-level antidiscrimination law. The reason is that
workers with disabilities in states with ADA-like provisions enjoyed
some form of employment protection well before the federal law went
into effect. In addition, one assumes that federal law should have its

only (or greater) impact in states that previously did not have a statute
like the ADA.43
The mixed findings from micro-level studies of the ADA have largely
contributed to our present state of uncertainty about the statute's

efficacy. Some papers concluded that the law disadvantaged workers

Others found that any supposed employment
with disabilities. 4
declines either were not due to the ADA or limited to the short term.4 5
Perhaps the greatest contributions from this scholarship were
methodological as opposed to substantive. Attention has been drawn to
the need for better survey measurements of disability. 46 Procedures for

empirically analyzing legislative interventions have advanced, in
particular state law-based quasi-experimental techniques.47
Estimating the existence and extent of the ADA's labor market

impacts has been very worthwhile for students of employment
discrimination and policymakers alike. Understanding whether a major
civil rights law fulfilled its chief mandates is an elementary question
worthy of examination. But there are two reasons to extend the
empirical ADA and employment discrimination agenda beyond these

standard inquiries. First, micro-econometric studies do not necessarily
tell us the extent to which the ADA has remedied discriminatory
practices. To be sure, none of these studies has produced a "disability
wage gap"-a measurement of the compensation discount employees
43. See, e.g., sources cited, supra note 12.
44. Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 12; DeLeire, Wage and Employment Effects, supranote 12.
45. See, e.g., Donohue et al., supra note 12 (finding scant evidence that the ADA negatively
impacted weeks worked for people with disabilities and support for wage declines for the disabled
beginning in 1986, before the ADA's passage); Christine Jolls & J.J. Prescott, Disaggregating
Employment Protection: The Case of Disability Discrimination (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 10740, 2004) (finding depressive effects on employment levels in the short term);
Richard V. Burkhauser, Andrew J. Houtenville & Ludmila Rovba, Accounting for the Declining
Fortunes of Working-Age People with Disabilities (December 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author) (also concluding that negative employment effects predated the ADA).
46. A number of disability scholars have criticized the once-dominant measure of disability
status in the U.S. Census Current Population Survey as irredeemably flawed. See, e.g., Thomas W.
Hale, The Lack of a Disability Measure in Today's Current Population Survey, 124 MONTHLY LAB.
REV., June 2001, at 38; Douglas Kruse & Lisa Schur, Does the Definition Affect the Outcome?
Employment Trends under Alternative Measures of Disability, in THE DECLINE INEMPLOYMENT OF
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: A POLICY PUZZLE 279 (David C. Stapleton & Richard V. Burkhauser eds.,

2003).
47. For prominent examples as applied to the ADA context, see Acemoglu & Angrist, supranote
12; Jolls & Prescott, supranote 45.
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with disabilities receive on account of discriminatory practices.48

Producing such a measurement is notoriously difficult. 49 Rather, the
studies begin with the premise that pre-ADA differentials in wages or
employment levels must have been the result of inefficient firm bias.

Any increase after the ADA's effective date must then have followed
from reductions in employer discrimination. The survey-based data
applied in these studies, however, only support such hypotheses

indirectly. Consequently, this work has not done as much to advance
our understanding of discrimination incidence, which should be of great
importance to employment discrimination scholars.
Second, and relatedly, an employer-side approach elides the

employee's involvement with the ADA's protections. The micro-level
studies emphasize the law's sword-like elements by testing the
hypothesis that employers respond to sanctions rationally. But they add
little to an account of the ADA's equally important employee shield
against adverse employment decisions. Without aggrieved employees'
willingness to come forward and submit charges, the ADA cannot
function as intended. 50 Stated otherwise, the employer-side methods

underscore how compensatory damages and equitable relief for unlawful
behavior dampen discrimination.

remedies are just as important.

The rights vindicated by those

Unless one incorporates employee

appeals to employment protections more explicitly, a rights-based

account figures passingly in the analysis.
2. Macroeconomic Studies
Empirical analysis focusing on employee responses to discrimination
are less numerous than the employer-side literature. Ample work, both

theoretical and empirical, has been conducted on the probability of filing
lawsuits.5 1

Only a relatively small fraction focuses exclusively on

48. For examples of studies determining or using a measure of wage gaps, see Amitabh Chandra,
Labor-Market Dropouts and the Racial Wage Gap: 1940-1990, 90 AM. ECON. REv. 333 (2000) (race);
Roland G. Fryer, Jr., Devah Pager & Jdrg L. Spenkuch, Racial Disparities in Job Finding and Offered
Wages, 56 J.L. & ECON. 633 (2013) (same); Claudia Goldin, A Grand Gender Convergence: lts Last
Chapter, 104 AM. ECON. REv. 1091 (2014) (gender).
49. See Kerwin Kofi Charles & Jonathan Guryan, Studying Discrimination: Fundamental
Challenges and Recent Progress,3 ANN. REv. ECON. 479 (2011).

50. The exceptions to the requirement that aggrieved parties submit charges allow (1) others to
file with the EEOC on behalf of an aggrieved party; and (2) any member of the EEOC to submit a
charge to the body. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.7(a) (2009), 1601.1 l(a) (2009).
51. Perhaps the most famous example is George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). For other notable articles, see Theodore
Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framewbrk with Empirical Tests, 19 J.
LEGAL STUD. 337 (1990); Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of PlaintiffVictory at Trial Is Possible, 25 J.
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predicting initial administrative complaint filings. Professors Laura
Beth Nielsen and Robert Nelson, for example, have studied the
52
antidiscrimination regime both at the outset of claim processing and at
final judgment. 53 In one contribution examining the so-called "pyramid
of disputes"-moving chronologically from adverse employment
experiences to filing lawsuits-the authors roughly estimated that "28%
of those who complain starting with the EEOC or 0.23% (23 in 10,000)
of the potential pool of 3.4 million self-identified targets of racial
54
discrimination in employment" file in federal court. Another paper on
case outcomes linked the result of EEOC case processing with litigation
outcomes. The estimates implied that "when the EEOC supports a
plaintiffs charge, there are no significant differences from cases with no
that does not
EEOC finding," but "[w]hen the EEOC issues a finding
early.",55
support the plaintiff, cases are less likely to settle
John Donohue and Peter Siegelman wrote a series of articles devoted
56 In one
to the empirics of Title VII employment discrimination filings.
paper, they developed a simple model for the net expected utility from
57
filing a discrimination suit in federal court after an unlawful dismissal.
The only relevant variables were the wage rate at the time of termination
(w), the cost of litigation (C), the probability of a liability finding at trial
58 (The
(p), and the duration between termination and judgment (D).
latter two variables are themselves functions of the unemployment rate.)
The first-order condition for the optimal reservation wage-the wage at
which employees would be indifferent between filing suit or not after a
discriminatory experience-implies that workers should be more willing
That result relies on the
to sue during recessionary periods.5 9
latitude to discriminate
greater
have
assumption that employers
unlawfully when the unemployment rate increases (because labor supply
exceeds demand). The assumption is reasonable because when the
unemployment rate rises, terminated employees will, on average, be
LEGAL STUD. 493 (1996); Peter Siegelman & Joel Waldfogel, Toward a Taxonomy of Disputes: New
Evidence Through the Prism of the Priest/KleinModel, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1999).
52. See Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 16.
53. See Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization?
Employment DiscriminationLitigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 175 (2010).
54. Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 16, at 706.
55. Nielsen et al., supranote 53, at 191.
56. See Donohue & Siegelman, ChangingNature, supra note 14; Donohue & Siegelman, Law
and Macroeconomics, supra note 14; Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, The Selection of
Employment Discrimination Disputes for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects to Test the
Priest/KleinHypothesis, 24 J.LEGAL STUD. 427 (1995).
57. Donohue & Siegelman, Law and Macroeconomics, supranote 14, at 719-21.
58. Id. at 719-20.
59. Id. at721-22.
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expected to search longer for new positions. On the other hand, longer
unemployment spells increase the expected value of litigation through a
higher back pay award (wD). Donohue & Siegelman called this the
"worker benefits effect." 60
The authors then distinguished between the worker benefits effect on
filings and its logical converse, what they termed the "employer
damages effect." If workers stand to profit from longer unemployment
spells for a given wage rate, then employers lose more during
recessionary periods. 6 1 Donohue & Siegelman attempted to separate
measurement of the worker benefits and employer damages effects in
four ways, three of which are not possible with the data used in this
Article. 62
The fourth-estimating the relationship between the
unemployment rate and EEOC charge patterns-figures prominently in
the empirical analysis below. They hypothesized that "aggrieved
workers commonly complain to the EEOC but that as they return to
work they let their case lapse if the EEOC response is not satisfactory,"
whereas "[t]hose who are still out of work when the economy goes into
a downturn are more likely to pursue their claim to federal court." 63 As
a result, on their account, "[a]lleged acts of employment discrimination
and EEOC complaints based on them [should] occur at a fairly constant
64
rate throughout the business cycle.",
Donohue & Siegelman confirmed that hypothesis, finding no
connection between the unemployment rate and EEOC charge activity
as they did for litigation filings. They offered two reasons for the null
result. First, Donohue & Siegelman referred to the lessons from their
worker-benefits model cost: "Given that the cost of filing with the
EEOC is essentially zero and the time frame for filing is very short,
there is little chance for the operation of the worker benefits effect
because everyone who might want to sue later files a discrimination
charge with the EEOC. 6 5 In other words, the infinitesimal cost of
charge submission combined with the narrow window available for
submitting a charge preclude any cost-benefit analysis based on the
length of unemployment spells. Workers will simply submit charges to
preserve their private rights of action, and, according to Donohue &
Siegelman, that strategy should be invariant to macroeconomic factors.
The second rationale is employee shortsightedness. Based on their
empirical analysis of EEOC charges, Donohue & Siegelman concluded:
60.
61.
62.
63.
-64.
65.

Id. at 722.
Id. at 723-24.
See Donohue & Siegelman, Law and Macroeconomics,supra note 14, at 726-48.
Id. at 741.
Id.
Id. at 743.
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[I]f potential litigants were farsighted, they would
presumably realize that a termination that occurs in a
recession will be more costly than one that occurs in a
boom. The lack of cyclicality in EEOC filings coupled
with the strong cyclical pattern in federal court filings
suggests, however, that although litigants will react to
the changed incentives of the higher backpay awards
when they know they have been out of work for some
time as their case grinds through the EEOC, they are not
good at anticipating that in a recessionary economy they
will likely be unemployed longer than they would in a
boom time. In other words, the absence of a strong
worker benefits effect operating on the filing of EEOC
litigants are myopic in
charges suggests that prospective
66
....
making
their decision
The myopia explanation is intuitively appealing. It seems equally
plausible, however, that charging parties-behaving as rational actorswould forecast the payoff of litigation identically at the charge and
litigation stages. If it is true that aggrieved employees understand that
litigation delay itself increases the size of wD beyond the time between
the accrual of the claim and suit, then they should also appreciate the
effect on back pay at the EEOC charge stage. So long as charging
parties realize that the EEOC processing stage can result in a right to sue
letter regardless of the reasonable cause determination, and that there is
virtually no cost to submitting a charge, backward induction should
result in the same prediction then as when standing at the courthouse
doors.
In some respects, the difference between the Donohue & Siegelman
inquiry and the present one is merely procedural. Filing suit and
initiating an EEOC investigation are, as discussed, two distinct stages in
the prosecution of a discrimination allegation. 67 And the Donohue &
Siegelman analysis included only Title VII claims; employees covered
than persons with
by that statute arguably face different constraints
68
reemployment.
to
respect
with
disabilities
But in other respects, the expected utility calculus for EEOC charges
should reduce to the same elements that inform the litigation decision.

66. Id. at 744.
67. See supra subpart I.A.
68. See Niklas Krause et al., Modified Work and Return to Work: A Review of the Literature, 8 J.

OCCUPATIONAL REHABILITATION 113, 114 (1998) ("Moreover, the longer the duration of work
disability, the less likely the injured worker will ever return to work. In fact, it is the minority of
workers with long-term disabilities which accounts for the majority of workers' compensation costs.")
(footnotes omitted).
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Donohue & Siegelman expressed the net expected value of a lawsuit as:
E(S) = pwD - (1 - p)C

(1)

First, alter Equation 1 so that X represents an EEOC charge, and let 7r
be the probability of success from EEOC conciliation. Here, I define
success as any firm- or EEOC-mediated settlement with compensatory
benefits. If success were defined as a right to sue letter following a
reasonable cause finding, then the benefit portion of the equation would
be identical to the cost, i.e., the expected value of litigation, because a
charging party may request a right to sue letter independent of the
EEOC's determination.69
Finally, let a be the settlement value,
presumed to be less than wD. Moreover, neither 7r nor a should be a
function of the unemployment rate because these parameters depend
only on the negotiation process. I can then express the net expected
value of submitting a charge as:
E(X) = 7r(a) - (1 - 7r)[E(S)]

(2)

E(X) = 7r(a) - (1 - ir)[pwD - (1 - p)C]

(3)

If 7r and a are not functions of the unemployment rate, then the firstorder condition for Equation 3 is identical to that in the original
Donohue & Siegelman formulation. I base these assumptions, again, on
the notion that conciliation efforts will occur early enough in the process
so that negotiation issues dwarf the economic effects of delay. This
construction, setting up the charge cost-benefit analysis in terms of
potential litigation, also rules out the charging party myopia theory. If
aggrieved employees know, as they reasonably should, that a charge
without reasonable cause still preserves litigation opportunities, then
EEOC submissions should be just as countercyclical as litigation filings.
That idea leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis la: Potentialhires or existing employees will be more likely
to submit EEOC charges during periods of economic downturns and
tighter labor markets, i.e., when higher unemployment leads to excess
laborsupply.
Embracing the same logic in Donohue & Siegelman's model, the
"success" of an EEOC charge presumably should vary with the
69. The only difference might be a recalibration of the litigation success probability under the
assumption that a reasonable cause finding would lead to Bayesian updating of the charging party's
prior.
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unemployment rate. The explanation follows from the worker benefits
effect. When the unemployment rate increases, the expected back pay
award should as well. But the probability of success on the merits
should remain constant for a given discrimination allegation. Stated
another way, the higher the back pay forecast, the lower the necessary
probability of success to outweigh the cost of submission. The reason
the model does not quite apply to charge success, though, is that the
expected benefit from a finding of reasonable cause does not always
lead to compensatory awards. Only success defined as monetary
settlement would resemble the final judgment payout. Furthermore, as
noted before, the charge submission process is virtually costless.
Combining these two points implies that the charge success rate 2r
should be inelastic with respect to the unemployment rate even though
the probability of litigation success p should negatively correlate with it.
Hypothesis lb: Because all charge submissions can lead to litigation,
regardless of the EEOC's reasonable cause determination, the
unemployment rate should have no bearing on the merits of charge
submissions.
C. PoliticalEconomy andLegal Factors
Empiricists of various disciplinary stripes have linked the success of
partisan elections to popular support for policy initiatives.7" In turn,
support for public programs can depend on partisan control of state and
national governments. A chief example is support for state incarceration
policy, where one political trope holds that "tough-on-crime stances
offer Republicans a way to connect with voting blocs" that might not
otherwise support their platform.7 1 In the race for votes, incumbents and
challengers alike face incentives to offer not just pork spending but also
72
to embrace substantive policy stances that resonate with the public.

70. See, e.g., Thomas M. Holbrook & Emily Van Dunk, Electoral Competition in the American

States, 87 AM. POL. S1.REV. 955 (1993).
71. Kevin B. Smith, The Politics of Punishment: Evaluating Political Explanations of

IncarcerationRates, 66 J. POL. 925, 928 (2004); see also Jeff Yates & Richard Fording, Politics and
State Punitiveness in Black and White, 67 J. POL. 1099 (2005); Andrew Leigh, Estimating the Impact of
GubernatorialPartisanshipon Policy Settings and Economic Outcomes: A Regression Discontinuity

Approach (Australian Nat'l Univ. Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 556, 2007),
https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/bitstream/I 885/47852/3/DP556.pdf
72. Another well-known empirical finding, though somewhat disputed, linked the timing of
mayoral/gubernatorial elections with the size of police forces. See Steven D. Levitt, Using Electoral
Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 270, 274-79

(1997). But see Justin McCrary, Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of
Police on Crime: Comment, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1236, 1236 (2002) (discovering that "an error in
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These two pathways suggest that, whether at the national or local level,
dominant political parties exogenously affect social responses, as new

institutionalists predict. This view emphasizes how politics stands
outside of the polity and sways public opinion through its various
institutional arms. 7 3

But the attenuated connection between state

government and federal antidiscrimination law should in turn dampen
any link between partisan control of state capitals and EEOC charge

activity.
A more likely relationship would exist solely at the federal level. A
very deep literature also has pinpointed how, once elected, political
figures, especially those on the national stage, exert agenda-setting
control over bureaucratic entities.7 4
Some versions emphasize
75
Congress's role, while others stress the President's. 76 Of course both

political branches perform important governance functions in the
administrative state, one by appointing members and the other through
the confirmation process. Regardless of which positive political theory
better explains agency control, the takeaway is that the federal

bureaucracy is much more than a collection of technocrats working on
national issues. Agency members can be and are deeply inclined to
pursue certain policy agendas based on the partisan control of
government.
The natural consequences of political control over
administrative levers could be twofold. First, there might be a feedback
loop where administrations less sympathetic to disability discrimination
charges marginally deter future submissions. If aggrieved employees at
tl, holding constant the true merit of underlying charges, were less

successful in reasonable cause determinations, future workers at t2 might
forego submitting charges. Second, holding constant the number of
submissions, one might expect administrations less sympathetic to

disability rights to be more exacting in their reasonable cause
Levitt's computer program [gave] highly variable crimes the most weight" and "severely bias[ed] all
standard errors").
73. See James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism: OrganizationalFactors in
Political Life, 78 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 734, 738 (1984) ("Political democracy depends not only on
economic and social conditions but also on the design of political institutions. The bureaucratic agency,
the legislative committee, and the appellate court are arenas for contending social forces, but they are
also collections of standard operating procedures and structures that define and defend interests. They
are political actors in their own right.").
74. See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of
PoliticalControl, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); see also David B. Spence, Administrative Law and
Agency Policy-Making: Rethinking the Positive Theory of Political Control, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 407
(1997).
75. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, SeparatedPowers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of
War Over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671 (1992).
76. See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, PoliticalInstitutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, 6 J.L. ECON.
& ORG., special issue, 1990, at 213, 235-38; Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the
Politicsof Structure, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1994).
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determinations 77 Although there is no explicit evidence that Republican
appointees at the EEOC implemented different enforcement policies,
empirical evidence suggests that disposition time and enforcement zeal
have lagged under GOP administrations. For example, claimants were
more than twice as likely to receive a no cause determination
78 under
President Reagan's EEOC than in the Carter Administration's.
Citizens also interact with major policies in ways wholly independent
of formal political channels. In previous research, I documented the
expressive effect of the ADA through negative media portrayals of
children with disabilities. 79 Such news stories arose just after the
ADA's passage and might have dissuaded some parents from bringing
fetuses with disabilities to term. The influence of expressive law theory
has waxed and waned over time, but its central insights remain
valuable.80 Informal norms that emerge just after a law's passage can
very often be as powerful as its textual contents. When a law's
expressive substance is strong, those meanings can become the primary,
albeit indirect, conduit for engagement with its provisions. Or judicial
action can transmit messages about the law's value while courts perform
their adjudicative functions. 81 Even administrative agencies like the
EEOC can create quasi-expressive pathways between legislation and the
law in ways not necessarily contemplated
wider public by implementing
82
text.
statutory
by the
77. See, e.g., B. Dan Wood, Does Politics Make a Difference at the EEOC?, 34 AM. J. POL. SC.
503, 506 (1990) ("The president also appoints the EEOC general counsel, who manages litigations on
behalf of the commission. In this role the general counsel plans the overall enforcement strategy of the
agency. The general counsel also acts as a filtering mechanism for litigation recommendations between
district offices and commissioners.").
78. Id. at 522; see also id at 519 (noting how the EEOC's time-to-resolution performance lagged
under Clarence Thomas's EEOC chairmanship).
79. See Dov Fox & Christopher L. Griffin, Jr., Disability-Selective Abortion and the Americans
with DisabilitiesAct, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 845, 867-70.
80. For definitive treatments and criticism of the expressivist paradigm, see Matthew D. Adler,
Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000); Elizabeth S.
Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
1503 (2000); Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339
(2000); Richard H. McAdams, A FocalPoint Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000).
81. See COLKER, supra note 13, at 74 (hypothesizing that Title I plaintiffs might have been more
selective when submitting charges as a result of the Supreme Court's gradual narrowing of the definition
of disability). Of course, these semi-expressive messages were rendered moot by the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, which broadened the definition of qualifying disabilities beyond that which
the Court had formulated. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat.
3553 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4) (2012)).
82. Theda Skocpol & Kenneth Finegold, State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early
New Deal, 97 POL. SCI. Q. 255, 260-61 (1982) ("The administrative organization of government is
crucial, especially when policies calling for increased government intervention are to be implemented.
Governments that have, or can quickly assemble, their own knowledgeable administrative organizations
are better able to carry through interventionist policies than are governments that must rely on
extragovemmental experts and organizations.").
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One approximate method for testing the relationship between social
norms and EEOC charge behavior compares jurisdictions by their
histories of pre-ADA disability protection. Specifically, did states that
enacted Title I-like statutes before 1990 produce different levels of
charge submission than states for which the ADA was a legal
innovation? The notion is not necessarily that a majority of state
residents supports employment discrimination protection for people with
disabilities. Rather, it posits that experience with disability rights
statutes creates certain social expectations that covered workers should
have legal recourse against employer bias. Those expectations in turn
legitimate resort to formal legal remedies. On that basis, I test the
following:
Hypothesis 2a: Aggrieved potential hires/dischargedemployees will be
no more or less likely to file EEOC charges in states governed by
Republican executives and legislatures. There should be, however, a
relationship between partisan control of the presidency and EEOC
charge activity patterns.
Hypothesis 2b: EEOC charges plausibly are more numerous and
meritorious in states that passed ADA-like laws before 1990 given a
longer history of exposure to and engagement with disability
employment protection.
D. Types of Disability
Disability advocates and scholars have long recognized that social
understanding of disabilities is not uniform across the spectrum of
conditions. Specifically, prevailing perceptions of mental/behavioral
conditions continue to sound in personal stigma or blame. 83 By contrast,
society tends not to blame people with physical disabilities for their
circumstances. Both groups suffer nevertheless from weaker support for
combating disability discrimination, especially relative to other
outlawed forms of discrimination (e.g., on the basis of race or sex).
83. See, e.g., Patrick Corrigan et al., An Attribution Model of Public Discrimination Towards

Persons with Mental Illness, 44 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 162, 173 (2003) (reporting that "[w]hen the
onset of mental illness is viewed as being under one's control, persons are more likely to avoid,
withhold help, and endorse coercive treatment of someone with mental illness"); Patrick W. Corrigan et
al., Stigmatizing Attributions About Mental Illness, 28 J. COMM. PsycH. 91, 98 (2000) (confirming
perceptions that society attributes the existence of mental health problems to individual behaviors rather
than external or environmental factors); Jack K. Martin et al., Of Fear and Loathing: The Role of
'DisturbingBehavior, 'Labels, and CausalAttributions in Shaping Public Attitudes TowardPeople with
Mental Illness, 41 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 208, 219 (2000) (finding from survey data that "a majority
of Americans also reject the idea of having [persons with mental health problems] as coworkers and
indicate an unwillingness to entertain them in their homes").

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

21

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 4

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 84

Disabilities arise in so many combinations and forms that they appear
highly individualized and specific to the outsider's eyes. Race and sex
discrimination, on the other hand, more readily align with a fundamental
identity- or group-based ill. This fact may have contributed to a
rationalization of discrimination against people with disabilities
that
84
increases as one moves from physical to behavioral conditions.
In addition, theorists have identified responses to disability as
reflecting either a "medical" or a "social" model. According to the
former, furthering disability rights would "reduce the complex problems
of disabled people to issues of medical prevention, cure or
rehabilitation."' 8 The nexus of disability and the person is clinical,
emphasizing impairment over structural barriers to integration. The
social model upended this line of thinking by recasting disability
precisely in a structural context. Whereas "conventional wisdom
attributes a disabled life to personal tragedy, or curse, or sin, or some
other fairly individualized phenomenon," the social account "redirects
86
attention to the environment surrounding an impaired individual.7
Combining the medical/social divide with varying attitudes toward
physical/behavioral conditions complicates matters still. Significant
evidence points to differential treatment of individuals claiming physical
rather than psychiatric conditions as the basis for workplace
discrimination. 87 Experiences like these seemingly stem flom a
stereotype that, even within the medical model of disability, behavioral
disorders are due more to individual "failure."
Or discrimination
persists because of what Elizabeth Emens identified as the "hedonic," or
experiential, cost of mental illness.
"Healthy" individuals fear
"emotional contagion" from their mentally ill colleagues because mental
88
illness in the workplace generates substantial negative externalities.
An affected employee then shuns his or her mentally ill colleague to
avoid hedonic costs, which "would look rather like classic employer
animus.,, 89 Physical impairments, on the other hand, could just as likely
result from misfortune as from risk-taking behavior. Therefore, they do
84. See Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn't "Just Right": The Entrenchment of the
MedicalModel ofDisability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 IND. L.J. 181, 190 (2008).
85. Tom Shakespeare, The Social Model of Disability,in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER 214,

216 (Lennard J. Davis ed., 4th ed. 2013).
86. Adam M. Samaha, What Good Is the Social Model of Disability?, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 1251,
1255 (2007); see also id. ("[T]he model moves causal responsibility for disadvantage from physically
and mentally impaired individuals to their architectural, social, and economic environment.").
87. See, e.g., Andrew Hsieh, Comment, The Catch-22 of ADA Title I Remedies for Psychiatric

Disabilities,44 MCGEORGE L. REv. 989, 992 (2013) (citing SUSAN STEFAN, HOLLOW PROMISES 4
(2001)).
88. See Elizabeth F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator:Mental Illness, Hedonic Costs, and

the ADA, 94 GEO. L.J. 399, 439-41 (2006).
89. Id. at 443.
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not carry the same hedonic costs as behavioral impairments do under
Emens' theory. Taken together, the medical/social models and the
physical/behavioral divide suggest:
Hypothesis 3: Aggrieved potential hires/employees with physical
conditions will be less likely to submit EEOC charges during
recessionary periods than those with less observable and more
misunderstoodbehavioralconditions. Physical disability discrimination
charges should also be more successful on average during recessionary
periods than charges based on behavioralconditions.
The rationale for this hypothesis as it relates to the unemployment
rate is disability salience. If people with disabilities already experience
longer unemployment spells following termination, the length of those
spells should be longer for employees with less favored conditions. For
example, a prospective hire with cerebral palsy might benefit from
sympathy in a way that someone with chronic depression might not.
This differential-both in terms of what the average employer considers
a disability and the potential employee's ability to alter expectationschanges the relative utility of the ADA as a form of unemployment
insurance.

II. THE LANDSCAPE OF ADA CHARGES
This Part offers preliminary assessments of the theories reviewed
above. A descriptive picture of disability employment discrimination
charges serves as an initial guide to the validity of those hypotheses.
Only with multivariate regression analysis can one achieve a rigorous
understanding of the links between macro-level phenomena and EEOC
Starting with a simple descriptive baseline, however,
activity.
contextualizes the more thorough empirical work that follows and helps
set the stage for the study's broad themes.
Here and for the remainder of the Article, I distinguish among three
concepts in EEOC procedure-filings, charges, and charge elementsto avoid confusion in terminology. I refer to filings as complaints that
initiate litigation-not the submission of a charge to the EEOC. The
EEOC has not linked its charge data to the federal docket; therefore,
filings are excluded from the analysis. The data only include charges
submitted to the EEOC as well as the elements that constitute each
charge (akin to counts in a complaint).
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A. Data
I use the universe of EEOC charges filed pursuant to Title I of the
ADA as the basis for the empirical analysis. 90 Before any alterations to
the administrative file, the data contain almost 550,000 observations.
Each original observation does not represent a single charge. Rather the
data file rows denote every charge element within separate charges. For
example, if a charging party alleged both inequitable working conditions
and unlawful discharge, each of those two grounds would appear as
separate dataset rows connected by the same unique EEOC charge
identifier. The file also contains a wealth of information about the
charge particulars and equally useful data about the charging parties
(without compromising their individual identities). In addition to the
years of charge submission and administrative closure, detailed
descriptions of how the parties resolved or otherwise disposed of
charges appear for every entry. It is therefore determinable both
whether the EEOC resolved a particular charge and also whether it
found cause. State codes for charge submissions exist for every
observation, and basic demographic information-race, imputed age,
and sex-appear for at least 90% of them. Finally, the file contains
some indication of the employer's NAICS industry code and employee
size (in broad categories), but the spottiness of this information makes it
minimally useful.
Testing any of the hypotheses in Part I required a merging of the
EEOC administrative data with other publicly available sources. First, I
gathered the official Bureau of Labor Statistics measure of the (not
91
seasonally adjusted) state unemployment rate and labor force size.
The unemployment rate by state and year is used straightforwardly as
the main regressor of interest for Hypotheses la and lb. Because of
significant differences across states (and potentially within states across
time), all regressions are weighted by the size of the labor force. The
political economy indicators are simply dummy variables for: (1) the
partisan affiliation of the Governor in every state/year; (2) the majority
party across both state legislative chambers 92 (which means that the
indicator could be "split"; and (3) the party of the President in office.
90. I am indebted to Dr. Brian T. McMahon of the Rehabilitation Counseling Department at the
Virginia Commonwealth University for providing a clean version, i.e., processed for analysis, of the raw
EEOC data for use in this Article.
91. The simplest way is to use the multi-screen data search option for "Local Area
Unemployment Statistics (LAUS)." To access the data search, see Databases,Tables & Calculatorsby
Subject, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/data/ (last visited July 28, 2015).
92. Nebraska's legislature is famously unicameral, and most analyses drop observations from the
state when there is any measurement of unified or divided legislatures. See, e.g., John D. Huber et al.,
Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy,45 AM. J. POL. Sct. 330, 336 n.2 (2001).
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Finally, I borrow the legislative coding in Christine Jolls' and J.J.
Prescott's study of the ADA's wage and employment effects. Their
schematic helpfully distinguished between states that protected
employees against discrimination but did not mandate reasonable
accommodation requirements from those that included both (and thus
were more "ADA-like.") 93 In the interest of capturing the full weight of
the ADA in the legal factors analysis, I code only the Jolls & Prescott
ADA-like states as protecting employees with disabilities before 1990.
Just fewer than 1800 observations (0.03%) in the EEOC
administrative file predate the ADA's effective date or contain missing
information on the submission date, the former presumed to have
resulted from clerical error. In addition, for purposes of analytical ease,
I dropped all observations from charges numbering ten or more separate
elements.9 4 After removing those observations, any charges submitted
outside the fifty states, and those with missing charging party
demographic indicators, the working dataset contains 403,032 records
and 201,048 charges. Table 1 summarizes those data at the charge level.

93. Jolls & Prescott, supra note 45, at 31-32 tbls. 1-2.
94. This cutoff is admittedly arbitrary, but limiting the charge elements to less than ten hopefully
preserves valuable information while increasing the precision of the empirical analysis. Some charges
contain an incredibly large number of distinct bases, up to ninety in one case. Eliminating charges with
more than nine constituent elements preserves 94% of the original data.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics, ADA Title I Charge Elements Between
1992 and 2011
(N = 201,048)
Variable
Demographics

Mean

I

Age
Sex
White
Black
Hispanic
Other
Disability Basis
Physical Impairment
Behavioral Impairment
Neurological Impairment
Sensory Impairment
Other Impairment
Record / Regarded
Association
Charge Basis
Discharge
Reasonable
Accommodation
Hiring

I Standard Deviation

44.15
0.48
0.63
0.22
0.08
0.07

10.69
0.50
0.48
0.42
0.27
0.26

0.38
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.19
0.13

0.48
0.35
0.31
0.22
0.40
0.34

0.40
0.16

0.49
0.37

0.08

0.26

Source: EEOC administrative data.

The summary statistics reveal that the charging population averages
about forty-four years in age, is divided almost evenly by sex, and is
approximately two-thirds white. Although the distinctions are not
beyond debate, conditions like cancer, disfigurement, and diabetes
qualify in the data as "physical." Examples of "behavioral" conditions
include manic-depressive disorder and anxiety, whereas epilepsy and
multiple sclerosis are classified as "neurological." Physical impairments
unsurprisingly are the most frequent conditions cited in discrimination
charges (38%), but behavioral and neurological conditions account for a
combined 25%. The ADA also recognizes a cause of action for persons
who have a record of a disability, are regarded as disabled, or are
associated with a person with a disability (R/RIA). 95

R/R/A

bases account for

13%

of the records,

Interestingly,

meaning that

95. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(l)(A)-(B), 12112(b)(4) (2012).
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approximately 26,000 adverse employment actions involved individuals
who did not necessarily have a qualifying condition. The remaining
rows summarize three of the most frequent adverse employer actions.
As others have observed, 96 the rate of discharge claims far exceeds that
of bias at the hiring stage, here five times as much.
B. DescriptivePatterns
The basic relationship between the unemployment rate and ADA Title
I discrimination charge frequency appears in Figure 1. The vertical bars
represent the number of charges by year (not the number of elements
across all charges), and the connected line tracks the national
unemployment rate. From 2003 to 2011, the two series appear to be
positively correlated; the number of discrimination charges moves in the
same direction as the unemployment rate. For most of the 1990s,
however, the charge rate held steady at approximately 14,000 per year.
The unemployment rate on the other hand experienced a secular decline
from almost 8% in 1992 to 4%.

96. See, e.g., Donohue & Siegelman, Changing Nature, supra note 14, at 984 ("While most
cases formerly attacked discrimination in hiring, today the vast majority of all litigation suits challenge
discrimination in discharge."); Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency's Role
in Employment DiscriminationLaw, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 16 (1996) ("In Fiscal Year 1992 ... the largest
percentage of claims related to individuals who claimed they had been unlawfully terminated, which
accounted for 53.4% of all claims. Only 17.8% of the EEOC cases involved claims for discriminatory
hiring.") (footnotes omitted).
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Figure 1: Annual Charge Submissions and the National Unemployment
Rate (1992-2011)
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Figure 1 implies that a systemic account using only the
unemployment rate as the explanatory factors is incomplete. Were that
relationship all that mattered, I would expect a decrease in charge
submission over the 1990s similar to the one observed between 2002
and 2005. Might national political tides contribute to the variation in
disability rights claims? A cursory glance also hints at a political
explanation. Claims reached their maximum during the first few years
of the Obama Administration. Of course, those years coincided with the
Great Recession. But the Clinton Administration also coincides more or
less with the other peak in discrimination charges.
Looking at each of the plots separately, Figure 1 also indicates that,
after the fi- st full year of enforcement, charges plateaued for a decade at
around 14,000 per year. Then in the early 2000s the charge rate dropped
precipitously to 5000 or less before increasing to 15,000 by 2010. One
of the more noteworthy features of Figure 1 is that the post-2008 charge
level surpassed its pre-2002 level but began to fall as the effects of the
Great Recession leveled off.
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What of the relationship between cause determinations and
macroeconomic conditions? Figure 2 shows-particularly from 1996 to
2000 and then again from 2007 to 2011-that the "success rate" also
correlates inversely with the unemployment rate; it is procyclical. Here,
a disposition counts as a success only if the EEOC found reasonable
cause that discrimination occurred. 97 In other words, when hiring is
more robust, the EEOC filings lead to more findings of discrimination.
The opposite is true during periods of labor market depression.
Figure 2." Annual Charge Success and the National Unemployment Rate
(1992-2011)
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Sources: EEOC administrative data; U.S. B0REAU OF LABOR STATS., supra Figure 1.
Note: The "success rate" counts only charges for which the EEOC found reasonable
cause for employer discrimination on the basis of disability.

III. PANEL DATA ANALYSIS OF TITLE I CHARGES
Having provided preliminary support for the relationship between
macroeconomic factors and EEOC charges, this Part turns to regressionbased evidence. Rather than a simple bivariate comparison of the
unemployment rate or political economy variables with charge
97. For more on the possible definitions of success at the EEOC stage, see infra subpart lII.A.2.
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submission and success rates, I control for a variety of other state-level
I also include
features that reasonably affect those outcomes.
demographic measures simply to show which groups file more and
receive more positive merits determinations-not to suggest a causal
relationship from race, age, or sex. Section III.A focuses on the purely
economic account, while Section III.B weaves in the political economy
explanations. Section III.C explores relative charge activity in states
with statutes that resembled what the eventual ADA eventually would
contain. Section III.D concludes by testing the unemployment rate
hypotheses by disability type.
The choice to use a panel data format rather than time series arises
from two methodological concerns. First, a time series study with
annual charge data over this limited window would suffer from too few
observations. With only one (national) observation per year, the N for
any regression would be capped at twenty. Executing the regressions
would not be impossible under the circumstances, but doing so would
demand more circumspect inference. Second, because one of this
study's goals is to track the relationship between macro-level influences
and EEOC activity as precisely as possible, using repeat observations of
the fifty states induces more profitable variation to that end. As others
have observed in empirical legal studies, using a panel structure bolsters
the reliability of statistical inference. 98 This is particularly true when
aggregating the time series elements masks significant variation within
those elements, be they legal, economic, or social. Panel data are used
most often when the existence of a law itself is an independent variable
of interest, which is not the case in this study. 99 Because this Article
does not attempt to estimate casual effects-just relationship
correlations-the panel structure enhances statistical precision by
effectively controlling for a host of confounding effects aside from the
primary macro-level factors below.
Finally, there should be no mistake about what type of statistical
inference I seek below. Empiricists routinely make use of panel data to
test causal relationships between exogenous variables and outcomes of
98. See, e.g., John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the

Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REv. 791, 801, 804 (2005) (noting that, for time-series data,
variation in a dependent variable is driven by factors common to states with different legal regimes,
which "suggests that a panel data analysis may provide more reliable estimates"). See generally
Nathaniel Beck, Time-Series-Cross-SectionData: What Have We Learned in the PastFew Years?, 4

ANN. REV. POL. So. 271 (2001) (reviewing the benefit of panel effects models in various contexts).
99. Likewise, the Donohue & Siegelman article did not evaluate the effects of a legal shift on
employment discrimination activity and adopted a time series methodology. They most likely chose
time series modeling because they could not obtain state-level identifiers to run repeated cross-sectional
regression. Thus, one can think of my approach as adding analytical precision by estimating the
relationship between the unemployment rate and charge outcomes repeatedly over the same fixed units,
i.e., the fifty states.
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interests. The fixed, repeated cross-section format (correcting for serial
correlation) boosts precision, which in turn generates more reliable
inference. No panel structure, however, produces anything remotely
approaching a causal explanation unless the analyst specifies an
exogenous identification strategy that plausibly mimics the underlying
causal story. I have no such causal strategy here. Instead, I present
regression coefficients on the macro-level variables implicated by the
hypotheses detailed above. The direction and size of the coefficients
then tell us something about the correlation between the independent
variables and EEOC outcomes. Controlling for demographic and other
state-level factors is intended to reduce estimate bias. As a result, I only
mention the existence of relationships-suggestive connections between
variables-and do not claim that any independent variable causes
variation in charge submissions or success rates.
A. The Unemployment Rate
Of the four hypotheses set out above, 100 whether EEOC charge
activity noticeably moves with the unemployment rate is the central
question. In this Section, I recast the Donohue & Siegelman EEOC
charge analysis using annual state-level data rather than their national
time series. I find consistent with the less myopic, standard rational
actor model that worker benefits operate at the charge submissions
stage. In all of the regression analysis that follows, I aggregate charge
elements up to single charge submissions because the dependent
variables of interest are the number and success rate of charges. The
EEOC will issue a reasonable cause determination so long as there is
01
any reasonable cause described in the charge documents. 1

100. See supra Part I.B-D.
101. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19(a) (2014) ("Where the Commission completes its investigation of a
charge and finds that there is not reasonablecause to believe that an unlawful employment practicehas
occurred or is occurringas to all issues addressedin the determination, the Commission shall issue a
letter of determination to all parties to the charge indicating the finding.") (emphasis added); Id. §
1601.21 (a) ("After completing its investigation, where the Commission has not settled or dismissed a
charge or made a no cause finding as to every allegation addressed in the determination under §

1601.19, the Commission shall issue a determination that reasonable cause exists to believe that an
unlawful employment practicehas occurredor is occurring .. ") (emphasis added).
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1. Charge Filings
The fully specified empirical model for addressing the threshold
unemployment rate relationship question is:
ln(Chargesst) = ao + fl, Unempst + # 2Unemp-st + r'xst + os + r + Es,

(4)

Equation 4 models the natural log of the number of charges by state
and year as a function of the state unemployment rate; the one-yearlagged state unemployment rate; a vector (X) containing means of age,
race, and sex indicators from the charging population; state fixed effects
(a); and a linear time trend (4.102 I used demographic information from
the charge files rather than the labor force population both because of
data limitations over the entire time period and because the coefficients
on these variables can be useful in simply observing adjusted charge and
success means by race, age, and sex. The lagged unemployment rate
accounts for the fact that present charge decisions might be affected
only after workers appreciate macroeconomic conditions from the
period before.10 3 I use the natural log transformation on the dependent
variable so that coefficient estimates reflect percentage changes for unit
changes in the associated independent variable. Each regression uses a
weighted ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator, where the weights are
the labor force population numbers in a given state and year. All
specifications calculate robust standard errors clustered by state.
Table 2 shows across four specifications that EEOC charge
submissions are robustly countercyclical in the current period. The
difference across columns stems from the variables included from
Equation 4. Columns 1 and 3 are the most parsimonious specifications,
including only the unemployment measures in the former and adding
state fixed effects in the latter. Columns 2 and 4 include the vector of
demographic variables. The fully specified model (Column 4) suggests
that a 1 percentage point increase in the current-year unemployment rate
boosts EEOC charges by 30%, but that the same increase in the previous
year's unemployment rate decreased submissions by 22%. The flipped
signs on these coefficients, combined with their extremely low p-values,
indicate that the worker benefits model operates precisely when it
should. That is, as soon as economic storm clouds gather, aggrieved
102. I experimented with an alternative specification replacing the linear trend term with year
fixed effects, and the results remained qualitatively similar. I retained the linear trend to mimic as
closely as possible the Donohue & Siegelman approach. Admittedly, their analysis used time series
methods rather than the panel structure in this Article. Possible collinearity between year fixed effects
and the unemployment rate in particular counsels against using fixed effects.
103. This setup is consistent with, for example, Donohue & Siegelman, Law and
Macroeconomics, supra note 14, at 718 tbl.2. I include only one lag, however, because their data were
collected quarterly and allowed for a more plausibly intricate lag structure.
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workers appear more likely to submit charges because the promise of
either conciliated settlement or back pay awards becomes more
attractive.
Table 2: ADA Title I Chargesand the Unemployment Rate (1992-2011)
Model
Variable
I
Unemployment
Rate
Unemployment
Rate-,
Age
Age

(1)
0.46**
(0.04)
-0.25***
(0.03)

2

I

(2)
0.33**
(0.04)
-0.20**
(0.03)
1.7 1 **
(0.34)
-0.02**

(3)
0.41"**
(0.03)
-0.29***

(0.03)

(0.00)
0.69
(0.84)
4.77***
(1.01)
5.07 ***

Female
Black
Hispanic
State Fixed
Effects?
N
0.15

(4)
0.30***
(0.04)
-0.22***
(0.03)
"***
1.16
(0.21)
-0 .0 1 **
(0.00)
0.87
(0.94)
4.72***
(1.57)
3.64 **
(0.81)
Y

(1.24)
N

Y

934

934

934

0.45

0.62

0.74

Sources: EEOC administrative data; U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., LOCAL AREA
UNEMPLOYMENT STATISTICS, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv?la (last visited July 9,
2015).
Notes: The dependent variable in all four columns is the natural log of the number of
ADA Title I charges. All regressions with race indicators also included an indicator for
"other" races so that "white" is the reference group; the coefficients on "other" are
unreported. All regressions also include a time trend and are weighted by the size of
the labor force in every state-year combination. All standard errors are clustered by
state. * =p < 0.10; ** =p < 0.05; *** =p < 0.01.

Notice, too, that the most parsimonious specification (Column 1),
which includes only the unemployment rate measures and a linear time
trend, explains 15% of the variation in charge submission activity. To
be sure, the robust point estimates on the unemployment rate
demonstrate the salience of macroeconomic health to EEOC charge
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But the rapidly increasing R2 across columns as more
activity.
covariates are added intimates that decisions to submit charges vary
significantly across states and time.
2. Success Rate
In this iteration, I investigate the factors that have some bearing on
the success rate of EEOC charges. Defining success at this stage, as
mentioned, presents a few difficulties. Unlike completed civil litigation,
which results in a liability judgment, EEOC procedures can be less
resolute. Litigation of course might induce settlement before final
judgment, but the ADA actively encourages conciliated agreement, and
Title VII mandates the same attempt. 10 4 Indeed, 16% of charges in the
working dataset resulted in independent settlement through private
grievance procedures or a positive EEOC-led conciliation. Do these
outcomes qualify as success for the charging party given that, in both
cases, the respondent employer compensated the charging party? Or
must there be an affirmative finding of discrimination accompanying
transfers? At the very least, success during or after EEOC processing
must not include default administrative closure.
For now, I restrict the measures of success to only two outcomes,
what I call "accepted determination" and "rejected determination."
Under the former heading are cases in which the EEOC determined that
discrimination occurred, and the respondent accepted its judgment. The
latter set encompasses cases where the EEOC determined that
discrimination occurred, but the respondent did not accept the
conclusion.
Charging parties, however, perhaps care as much about remedies as
they do liability determinations. Like the plaintiff who achieves pretrial settlement without the defendant admitting liability, EEOC
charging parties often withdraw their filings or settle without an
administrative determination. To deem the process successful, however,
the charging party must have received some compensation or other
benefits. The data include such settlements where (1) resolution was
achieved without EEOC intervention; or (2) the EEOC participated in
the negotiations. I present the analysis on success rates separately for
the default categories of accepted and rejected determinations only and
104. See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (2012) ("Where appropriate and to
the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement
negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, fact-finding, minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged
to resolve disputes arising under this chapter."); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)
(2012) ("If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is reasonable cause to believe
that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful
employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.").
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then for the default plus negotiated settlement.
Relative to submission probabilities, any link between the
unemployment rate and the success of those submissions is somewhat
attenuated in absolute value. Table 3 adopts the default measure of
success-an explicit EEOC finding of discrimination-and follows the
same design as Equation 4, now with the logged mean success rate
across charge submissions in state-years as the dependent variable.
Table 3: Baseline ADA Title I Charge Success and the Unemployment
Rate (1992-2011)
Model
Variable
Unemployment
Rate
Unemployment
Rate-,
Age

(1)
-0.24"**
(0.05)
0.06
(0.05)

Age 2

Female
Black

(2)
-0.20"*"
(0.05)
0.03
(0.05)
-1.21
(0.29)

I

(3)
-0.26"*
(0.06)
0.02
(0.05)

I

(4)

-0.20**
(0.05)
-0.03
(0.04)
-1.00*
(0.41)

0.01"**

-0.01*

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.29
(0.47)
-1.30 "*

0.47
(0.53)
-2.81 **

Y

(0.49)
-1.75**
(0.57)
Y

State Fixed
Effects?
N

N

(0.49)
-1.04*
(0.57)
N

770

770

770

770

R2

0.21

0.28

0.32

0.42

Hispanic

Sources: EEOC administrative data; U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., supra Table 2.
Notes: The dependent variable "success" in all four columns counts only charges for
which the EEOC found reasonable cause for employer discrimination on the basis of
disability, and it is the natural log of the percentage of charges resulting in a reasonable
cause finding. All regressions with race indicators also included an indicator for
"other" races so that "white" is the reference group; the coefficients on "other" are
unreported. All regressions also include a time trend and are weighted by the size of
the labor force in every state-year combination. All standard errors are clustered by
state. * =p < 0.10; ** =p < 0.05; ***=p < 0.01.
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The point estimates range from a 20%to a 24% decrease between the
most and least specified models (Columns 4 and 1, respectively). These
coefficients reject the null of Hypothesis lb and are consistent with the
resilience of the worker benefits model. Recall that the model predicts a
drop in the reservation wage necessary to file suit and a corresponding
increase in less meritorious filings. The reason, again, is that with
higher unemployment durations, the prevailing wage that would
constitute the back pay judgment is permitted to be lower for a fixed
cost of litigation. Even setting aside case merit, Donohue & Siegelman
acknowledged that "[l]ower-wage plaintiffs are presumably less
sophisticated, have poorer legal representation than those with higher
wages, or both, and may therefore prevail less often for any given level
of case quality." 10 5 One cannot determine from these data whether (1)
charges below the margin of merit are submitted more often during
recessionary periods; (2) employers are less likely to discriminate on the
basis of disability during economic slumps; or (3) more meritorious
cases are settled before final EEOC determination during these periods.
A glimpse into the latter question is possible once the definition of
success is expanded.
When I expand the definition of charge success to encompass
negotiated settlement, the results change substantially as shown in Table
4. The estimated relationship between the unemployment rate and a
favorable outcome for charging parties drops by about 70% to
somewhere between 6% and 9%, although the level of statistical
significance remains high (p < 0.01). Because the estimates remain
greater than zero in absolute value, I know that this higher negotiated
settlement rate does not outweigh the procyclicality of reasonable cause
determinations. 10 6 One implication must be that settlements are
countercyclical or have no relationship with the unemployment rate.
The former probably is closer to the truth as prior empirical work has
association between the unemployment rate and
found a positive
10 7
settlements.

105. Donohue & Siegelman, Law and Macroeconomics, supranote 14, at 751 n.77.
106. See Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 56, at 431.
107. See id. at 445-51.
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Table 4: ExpandedADA Title I Charge Success and the Unemployment
Rate (1992-2011)
Model
Variable
Unemployment
Rate
Unemployment
Rate-,
Age

(1)
-0.08**"
(0.01)
0.07**
(0.02)

2

Age

Female
Black
Hispanic

(2)
-0.05"'.
(0.01)
0.06***

(3)
-0.09(0.01)
0.07***

(4)
TTT
-0.06
(0.01)
0.05***

(0.02)
-0.43***
(0.10)
0.00**

(0.02)

(0.01)
-0.48**
(0.11)
0.01**

(0.00)

(0.00)

-0.07
(0.20)
-0.59***
(0.20)
-0.57*

0.02
(0.21)
-1.10*
(0.44)
-0.82**

(0.31)

(0.33)
State Fixed
Effects?
N

N

N

Y

Y

899

899

899

899

R2

0.06

0.18

0.22

0.34

STATS., supra Table 2.
Notes: The dependent variable "success" in all four columns counts (1) charges for
which the EEOC found reasonable cause for employer discrimination on the basis of
disability; and (2) charges that were settled before a final determination but that led to
compensation awards for the charging party. It is the natural log of the percentage of
charges resulting in either of those outcomes. All regressions with race indicators also
included an indicator for "other" races so that "white" is the reference group; the
coefficients on "other" are unreported. All regressions also include a time trend and are
weighted by the size of the labor force in every state-year combination. All standard
errors are clustered by state. *=p<0.l0; **=p<0.05 ; ***=p<0.0l.

Sources: EEOC administrative data; U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR

Although it is intuitively appealing to count compensated settlement
as a "win" for charging parties, the results in Table 4 caution against
doing so. First, conciliation results in a monetary transfer because the
threat of eventual suit looms over the employer, just as in standard civil
litigation models. But for the shadow of ADA litigation, the charging
party would not receive payments. For these cases, though, the analyst
never knows with requisite certainty how meritorious the charge was.
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This truism of course affects all normative analysis of settlement versus
trial. Second, and more important, these results confirm prior findings
of incomplete operation of the Priest-Klein model; observed reasonable
cause determinations and conciliation outcomes have opposing
connections to macroeconomic conditions and should be treated
separately. 108

B. PoliticalEconomy and Legal Factors

Theories of political economy and administrative agency functions
suggested that support for some state-level policies can be related to
partisan tides and the relative priorities that different administrations
place on disability employment rights. Because I only consider federal
discrimination charges in this study, I did not expect that state control of
governorships or the legislature would have a measurable connection to
charge patterns. Because of presidential administration agendas and
priority-setting-not to mention selection control over appointees who
more directly affect agency functioning-these theories predicted a
national political economy account to emerge in the data.
1. State Political Economy Factors
Somewhat consistent with Hypothesis 2a, the partisan affiliation of
state governors is barely related, if at all, in a statistical sense with
charge submission frequency. Interestingly, however, charges are less
likely to be submitted in states where Republicans control both
chambers in the legislature by about 44%. Nevertheless, the sign on that
coefficient flips from positive to negative with the inclusion of state
fixed effects. The difference between, say, Columns 2 and 4 is that all
state-year observations are compared against each other in the former
specification. When state fixed effects enter the model in Column 4, the
regression is constrained to "within-state" comparisons. As a result the
estimates on the political economy variable reflect only outcome
comparisons in one state over time, which are then averaged over all
jurisdictions.

108. Seeid. at431.
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Table 5: ADA Title I Charges and State Political Economy Factors
(1992-2011)

Variable
Republican
Governor
Republican
Legislature
Split
Legislature
Age

(1)

0.12
(0.20)
0.07

(0.38)
0.14

(0.33)

2

Age

(2)
0.10
(0.12)
0.35
(0.28)
0.40*
(0.22)
1.80***
(0.33)
-0.02***

Model
1

(3)
0.00
(0.12)
-0.43**
(22.76)
-0.15

(0.18)

(4)
0.09

(0.09)

-0.44 **

(0.15)
-0.23
(0.14)

1.2 5 **

(0.21)
-0.01**

(0.00)

(0.00)

4.94*"

State Fixed
Effects?
N

N

5.53*
(1.00)
5.78
(1.35)
N

984

984

984

984

R2

0.01

0.39

0.54

0.68

Black
Hispanic

Y

(1.44)
3.65
(0.97)
Y

Sources: EEOC administrative data; Former Governors' Bios, NATIONAL GOVERNORS
ASSOCIATION, http://www.nga.org/cms/FormerGovBios (last visited July 8, 2015);
State PartisanComposition, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (last visited
July 8, 2015).
Notes: The dependent variable in all four columns is the natural log of the number of
ADA Title I charges. Allregressions with race indicators also included an indicator for
"other" races so that "white" is the reference group; the coefficients on "other" are
unreported. Each specification also included an unreported coefficient for governors
that were independent of the Republican and Democrat Parties. All regressions also
include a time trend and are weighted by the size of the labor force in every state-year
combination. All standard errors are clustered by state. * =p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05;
*** =p < 0 .0 1 .

Accordingly, I am reluctant to reject the null hypothesis of no
relationship between state political factors and ADA Title I charge
patterns. The state fixed effects specifications are preferable to those in
the first two columns given the panel structure of the data, but a swing
of the magnitude observed should give pause- when interpreting
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results. 10 9 Going forward, I concentrate exclusively on national-level
factors, for which coefficient estimates are much less variable.
2. National Political Economy Factors
Table 6 more strongly corroborates Hypothesis 2a by demonstrating a
positive relationship between the partisan identity of presidential
administrations and EEOC charge filings. Columns 3 and 4 indicate that
the submission rates about doubled during the Clinton presidency and
Obama's first term relative to the end of George H.W. Bush's and
George W. Bush's two terms. Moreover, as with the unemployment
rate, presidential party affiliation explains a healthy percentage of the
variation in charge submission (as much as 75%).

109. See, e.g., Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 98, at 827-32 (calling into question the reliability
of empirical estimates when coefficient signs and magnitudes changed dramatically from one
specification to the next).
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Table 6: ADA Title I Charges and PresidentialPolitics (1992-2011)
Model
(4)
0.90**
(0.06)
1.11 ***
(0.20)
-0.01 ***

(3)
1.10(0.04)

Age2

(2)
0.84*
0
1.73
0
-0.02

Black

(0.00)
4.71 "**

(0.00)
3.45 **
(1.26)
3.60***
Y

(0.85)
Y

Variable
Democrat
President
Age

(1)
1.09"**
(0.04)

State Fixed
Effects?
N

N

(1.00)
5.33**
(1.30)
N

984

984

984

984

R2

0.14

0.44

0.66

0.75

Hispanic

Sources:

EEOC

administrative

data;

The

HTTPS://WWw.WHITEHOUSE.GOV/1600/PRESIDENTS

Presidents,
(last visited

WHITEHOUSE.GOV,

July

2,

2015)

[hereinafter The Presidents].
Notes: The dependent variable in all four columns is the natural log of the number of
ADA Title I charges. All regressions with race indicators also included an indicator for
"other" races so that "white" is the reference group; the coefficients on "other" are
unreported. Each specification also included an unreported coefficient for governors
that were independent of the Republican and Democrat Parties. All regressions also
include a time trend and are weighted by the size of the labor force in every state-year
combination. All standard errors are clustered by state. * p < 0.10; ** -p < 0.05;
*** =p < 0 .0 1.

Additional research will be necessary to substantiate the
administrative agenda-setting hypothesis more fully. Table 6 is only
suggestive of that correlation. For example, collecting data on the
professional backgrounds and partisan affiliations of commissioners
appointed by each president would amplify empirical support for the
impact of administrative turnover. The best I can posit based on Table 6
is that there is some independent relationship between presidential
politics and charge submission rates. Given that the Clinton years were
marked by declining unemployment and that unemployment rose during
the end of both Bush Administrations, Hypothesis 1 would imply a
negative (positive) coefficient on the Democrat (Republican) variable.
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The opposite outcome evidences that partisan control over bureaucratic
agendas has some bearing on the propensity of workers with disabilities
to submit ADA employment discrimination charges.
Table 7 contains perhaps the most fascinating results in this Article.
Given prior conclusions about EEOC charges and presidential
politics,' 10 one would have forecast that marginal charges would receive
more favorable treatment by Democrat-led Commissions. Controlling
for state effects, the passage of time, and available charging party
demographic characteristics-as Column 4 does-nonetheless results in
a point estimate of -37%. The consistently negative estimates in the first
row of the table do not prove that EEOCs dominated by Democrat
appointees issue fewer cause determinations independent of charge
merit.111 They just as easily could imply that ostensibly aggrieved
employees submit fewer factually meritorious charges under Democrat
leadership. Another possibility is that the vast majority of charges filed
under a Democrat president were during the Clinton years. His
administration effectively oversaw the first eight years of ADA
enforcement (1993-2000), and it could be that the labor force required
more experience with qualified disabilities and evidence of
discrimination before charging parties submitted allegations closer to the
optimal number.

110. See supranote 78 and accompanying text.
111. Recall that the measure of charge success reflects only EEOC for-cause determinations from
this part of the empirical analysis forward.
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Table 7: ADA Title I Charge Success and PresidentialPolitics (19922011)
Model
Variable
Democrat
President
Age
Age

(1)
-0.51
(0.05)

(2)
-0.41
(0.05)
-1.08"**

(3)
-0.53***
(0.05)

(0.27)

(0.37)

-0.01 *

-0.01**

2

(4)
-0.37***
(0.05)
-0.83**

(0.00)

(0.00)

-2.82***

Black

-1.45***

(0.47)

(0.94)

Hispanic

-1.32***
(0.55)

-1.43*
(0.76)

State Fixed
Effects?

N

N

Y

Y

N

807

807

807

807

R2

0.13

0.22

0.22

0.31

Sources: EEOC administrative data; The Presidents, supra Table 6.
Notes: The dependent variable "success" in all four columns counts only charges for
which the EEOC found reasonable cause for employer discrimination on the basis of
disability, and it is the natural log of the percentage of charges resulting in a reasonable
cause finding. All regressions with race indicators also included an indicator for
"other" races so that "white" is the reference group; the coefficients on "other" are
unreported. All regressions also include a time trend and are weighted by the size of
the labor force in every state-year combination. All standard errors are clustered by
state. * =p<0.l0;** =p<0.05;***=p<0.0l.

The opportunity for additional work on this question is ripe. An
empirical literature on political agency control has emerged in the last
decade and enhanced our knowledge about the extent to which
112

presidents can achieve dominance over the federal bureaucracy.

112. See, e.g., Keith S. Brown & Adam Candeub, Partisans& PartisanCommissions, 17 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 789 (2010); Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So-Independent Agencies: Party
Polarization and the Limits of InstitutionalDesign, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459 (2008); Joan Flynn, A Quiet
Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation of the NLRB, 1935-2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361
(2000); Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and PersonnelBefore a New
President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557 (2003); Christopher L. Griffin, Jr., An EmpiricalAssessment
of PanelEffects in Quasi-judicialDecision Making (Aug. 1, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
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Previous studies have speculated at a political economy explanation for
EEOC processing data but using only aggregate statistics on charge
submissions. Combining the individualized data that the administrative
file here contains with similarly detailed information about
administrative appointments will potentially yield results more
suggestive of a causal story.
3. State Disability Law Factors
Table 8 condenses both the charge number and success analyses into
one presentation-the former in Columns 1 and 2, the latter in Columns
3 and 4. It provides partial support for Hypothesis 2b, which is limited
to the charge submission portion. For a state to be counted as having an
ADA-like statute, the law must have been passed before 1990 and
included both standard employment protections and reasonable
accommodation mandates. The only statistically discernible relationship
is between the presence of such a statute on the books and charge
To test whether this link varied with presidential
submissions.
administration, I interacted that indicator with the ADA-like one. As
both Columns 2 and 4 indicate, the point estimates were relatively small
and insignificant. (The coefficient estimates on the presidential politics
variable alone remains positive and significant.)
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Table 8: ADA Title I Charge Patterns and StateDisabilityLaw (19922011)

Variable
ADA-like
Statute
Democrat
President
ADA *
Democrat
Age
Age

2

Black
Hispanic
State Fixed
Effects?
N

Charge Submissions
(1)
1
(2
1.61"**
1.68***

(0.18)

(0.18)
0.92***

Charge Success
(3)
1
(4)
-0.53
-0.72**
(0.35)
(0.36)
-0.34***

(0.06)
-0.09

(0.07)
-0.05

(0.09)

1.11 **

1.26***
(0.21)
-0 .13 **

(0.20)

-0 .0 1

-0.85**
(0.40)
0.01"

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

**

(0.37)
0.01"

(0.00)

(0.85)

(0.82)

Y

Y

-2.83 **
(0.94)
-1.44*
(0.76)
Y

984

984

807

807

0.67

0.75

0.28

0.31

5 .0 1 **
(1.49)
3 .7 3 **
(0.97)
Y

3.44 **
(1.27)
3.59***

(0.10)
-0.83**

-3.40

(1.10)
-1.43*

Sources: EEOC administrative data; Jolls & Prescott, supra note 45, at 32 tbl.2; The
Presidents,supra Table 6.
Notes: The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 is the natural log of the number of
ADA Title I charges. The dependent variable "success" in Columns 3 and 4 counts
only charges for which the EEOC found reasonable cause for employer discrimination
on the basis of disability, and it is the natural log of the percentage of charges resulting
in a reasonable cause finding. All regressions with race indicators also included an
indicator for "other" races so that "white" is the reference group; the coefficients on
"other" are unreported. All regressions also include a time trend and are weighted by
the size of the labor force in every state-year combination. All standard errors are
clustered by state. *=p<0.l0;**=p<0. 0 5 ; *** =p<0.0l.

Turning to charge success, the state law dummy is not statistically
significant after the inclusion of charging party demographic factors.
And, once again, no measurable effect attached to the interaction term.

The overall inference from Table 8 appears to be that employees in
states at the frontier of disability employment rights might have been
more familiar with alleging discrimination by the time the ADA arrived.
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Those localized experiences might have legitimated, or at the very least
inured, resort to legal process following experiences of workplace
discrimination. Despite this path-dependent positive outcome for charge
frequency, the sign of the charge success variable is negative, which
would imply that on average charges had less clear merit in those states.
A result like this could be explained by overcharging relative to
underlying cause, but the lack of robust statistical significance between
Columns 3 and 4 undermines that conclusion.
C. UnderstandingTitle I Charges by Disability Type
Identifying one's disability extends well beyond the dichotomy of
having a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities." 113 The range of possible conditions spans
the
physical/mental/behavioral,
the
dimensions:
several
temporary/chronic, and the observable/unobservable, to name a few. As
mentioned above, 11 4 whether the ADA mimics an unemployment
insurance mechanism during recessionary times might depend as much
on macroeconomic conditions as on the nature of one's disability. For a
given unemployment rate, potential or existing hires with more salient
conditions might be able to secure positions more easily than their
counterparts with less sympathetic disorders.
To test this hypothesis, I divided the data set into three components:
charges where the disability basis was physical, behavioral, or "other" in
nature. Two features of the data require additional explanation. First, I
adopted an existing coding in the data set that separated charges into six
general disability types. There are two categories where the labeling is
exclusively physical or behavioral. But a few other types straddle the
Rather than contaminate the coding through additional
line.
aggregation, I lumped the other four categories, which have much
smaller frequency counts to begin with, into the "other" grouping.
Examples of each include: asthma, cancer, and cystic fibrosis (physical);
manic depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, and schizophrenia
(behavioral); and epilepsy, leaning disability, and multiple sclerosis
(other). Second, charging parties often predicate their allegations on
more than limiting condition. With no obvious method for choosing
one-and not wishing to have multiple observations per
individual/charge-I determined the modal condition for each charge
and used that as the measure. Doing so required dropping charges
where the number of conditions claimed was equal across at least two

113. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012).
114. See supra subpart I.D.
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types.

Tables 9 and 10 also reveal unexpected statistical associations
between disability type and charge patterns. Contrary to expectations,
the coefficient estimates are almost identical across Columns 1-3 in
Table 9. These results mean that the link between the unemployment
rate and charge submission totals remains countercyclical, at 29% on

average. No observable difference, however, exists by the employee's
underlying condition covered by the ADA. Hypothesis 3 suggested that
the submission rate would be different across types because of

differential rates of discrimination. The idea was that discrimination
would emerge more often among workers with behavioral disabilities
because their conditions are more feared or misconstrued. But the data

do not support this reading, at least under the assumption that employees
submit charges roughly proportional to their actual experience of
discrimination.
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Table 9: ADA Title I Charges and the Unemployment Rate by Disability
(1992-2011)
Type

Variable
Unemployment
Rate
Unemployment
Rate-,

Physical

Age
Age

2

Black
Hispanic
State Fixed
Effects?
N

0.29***
(0.03)

Disability Type
Behavioral
I
0.28"*p

I

(0.02)

Other

0.30"***
(0.03)

-0 .2 0 * "

-0.20***

-0.18**

(0.02)

(0.02)

2.00***
(0.54)
-0.02 *

0.74***
(0.28)
-0.0 1 **

(0.22)
-0.01 **

(0.01)

(0.00)

(0.00)

4.39***
(1.52)
4 .1 5 *
(0.57)
Y

2.48*
(1.47)
3.80 "***

(0.58)

2.67**
(1.40)
3 .9 2 * "
(0.61)

Y

Y

894

853

906

0.77

0.72

0.74

(0.03)
0.90 * "

Sources: EEOC administrative data; U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., supra Table 2.
Notes: The dependent variable in all four columns is the natural log of the number of
ADA Title I charges. All regressions with race indicators also included an indicator for
"other" races so that "white" is the reference group; the coefficients on "other" are
unreported. All regressions also include a time trend and are weighted by the size of
the labor force in every state-year combination. All standard errors are clustered by
state. * =p < 0.10; ** =p < 0.05; *** =p < 0.01.

Table 10, though, offers slightly more evidence that charge success
differs across the business cycle by disability type. Again, the point
estimates are rather counterintuitive; the more recessionary the time

period, the more likely employees with behavioral disabilities are to
receive a reasonable cause determination compared to those with

A potential explanation that still supports
physical conditions.
Hypothesis 3 is that, with higher charge rates, the merits composition of
allegations is not held constant between the two groups.

Employees

with physical disabilities might be more inclined to submit to the EEOC
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at the margin, incentivized by the worker benefits effect, which could in
turn dilute the aggregate merit rate for that group. On the other hand,
the number of observations is decidedly lower in Column 2 than
Column 1, which could be a function of fewer state-year combinations
with behavioral disability charges (see the N in Table 9) or fewer stateyear combinations with any successful charges for behavioral
conditions.
Table 10: ADA Title I Charge Success and the Unemployment Rate by
Disability Type (1992-2011)

Variable
Unemployment
Rate
Unemployment
Rate-,
Age
2

Age

Physical
*
-0 .23 "

(0.07)
0.05
(0.02)
-2 .19 **
(0.54)

Disability Type
Behavioral
-0.16**
(0.03)
0.04
(0.02)

I

-1.75*
(0.82)

Other
7U-02*

(0.05)
-0.03
(0.04)
-1.00*
(0.45)
0.01*
(0.01)

0.02**
(0.01)
-3 .15 **
(1.52)

-3.44**
(1.57)

-2.53***
(0.57)

-2.46***
(0.77)

State Fixed
Effects?

Y

Y

N

615

421

692

0.42

0.44

0.43

Black
Hispanic

0.02**
(0.01)

-3.50***
(1.27)
-3.05 **
(0.62)

Sources: EEOC administrative data; U.S. BuREAu OF LABOR STATS., supra Table 2.
Notes: The dependent variable "success" counts only charges for which the EEOC
found reasonable cause for employer discrimination on the basis of disability, and is the
natural log of the percentage of charges resulting in a reasonable cause finding. All
regressions with race indicators also included an indicator for "other" races so that
"white" is the reference group; the coefficients on "other" are unreported. All
regressions also include a time trend and are weighted by the size of the labor force in
every state-year combination. All standard errors are clustered by state. * =p < 0.10;
** =p < 0.05; *** =p < 0.01.
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IV. RESEARCH AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This Article has traversed a wide swath of territory covering several
aspects of ADA Title I discrimination charges. From macroeconomic
forces to political economy factors to legal experiences with
antidiscrimination law, the administrative data mostly hint at
correlations with charge submission practices. The same is somewhat
less true for success outside of the unemployment rate analysis. What
does one begin to make of these various results?
In terms of social science findings, a link seems to exist between
EEOC charge submissions and the unemployment rate where one was
" 5 My research design differed in two potentially
not found before.11
important ways: use of all the relevant information contained in charge
documents and a panel structure using variation in the state
unemployment rate rather than the less dynamic national counterpart. I
attribute this difference simply to data availability: Donohue &
Siegelman had access to quarterly national data, whereas I made use of
data that only indicated the year of submission but included the state
The results of Section III.A therefore
location of submission.
data
demonstrate in part the need for testing hypotheses using 1different
16
strategies.
empirical
formats-and
case,
this
in
sources-or
On the other hand, both my design and the Donohue & Siegelman
version are more suggestive of statistical relationships and do not
overtly claim causal links between macro-level factors and EEOC
activity. Consider the charge success regressions, for example. Just as
one might conjecture a relationship in which higher unemployment rates
decrease the "win rate," so, too, could movements in reasonable cause
determinations shape the unemployment rate. The effect certainly might
be too small to matter statistically, but in fact as the number of
individuals with disabilities who are not reinstated or fail to regain
employment after an EEOC charge, litigation, or both increases, fewer
will count as active in the labor force. The point is that the foregoing
analysis easily could suffer from endogeneity or other biases in ways
that preclude straightforward causal inference. The goals of this project
were not identification of that sort; rather, I sought to tease out the
contours of relationships between structural factors and EEOC activity.
A promising avenue of future research would involve the collection
of additional data to understand better the interplay between state FEPA
filings and EEOC charges. The state-level structure of the dataset used
here ostensibly induced more variation in the unemployment rate over
115. Donohue & Siegelman, Law and Macroeconomics, supranote 14, at 741-44.
116. For another recent example, see Donohue et al., supra note 12 (applying the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics to the microeconomic Title I question instead of the Current Population Study).
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time, which was helpful for statistical purposes. This variation also
might imply that local economic conditions could induce different levels
of recourse to state disability discrimination statutes. As noted before,
the ADA strikes a federalism compromise regarding the investigation of
employment discrimination, allowing the states priority over the EEOC
when the charging party files with its FEPA. 117 To my knowledge, no
empirical work has taken up questions related to dual filing with state
FEPAs and the EEOC. Do aggrieved employers who file with both
agencies fare any differently than those who file with only one? Does
the additional time-to-file with the EEOC materially change processing
and outcomes?' 18 These and other questions related to the optimal
enforcement of disability discrimination would advance the employeeside agenda and our understanding of engagement with the ADA.
The results in this Article also illuminate a few significant policy
ideas. First, additional confirmation that EEOC charge submissions
are countercyclical intensifies the need to shore up the agency's
infrastructure during economic downturns.
Charges trigger
investigations (unless dismissed'19), and investigations are costly
endeavors. Indeed, the most recent budget request from the EEOC
has estimated the cost of private sector enforcement at about $295
million, with $207 million dedicated to administrative charge
resolution. 120 Meanwhile, the Commission Chair averred that "[o]ne
of the agency's greatest challenges has been, and continues to be,
resolving discrimination chargesfiled by private andfederal sector
employees andjob seekers promptly, while at the same time ensuring
that the rights of the charging parties and respondents receive
appropriate attention and respect.' 2 1 Surely these projections
include some accounting for economic declines. But economic
shocks by definition are difficult to predict ex ante. The EEOC will
require secured funding for personnel, especially in years of
macroeconomic slump, to meet all its enforcement mandates.
Second, although economic theory predicts an increase in
marginally meritorious charges during recessionary periods, one
could also argue that the level of charge activity is inefficient. In
fiscal year 2014, the EEOC resolved 24,411 charges, and 15,074
117. Seesupra note 26.
118. Employees who previously submitted charges to a FEPA have extra time from the accrual of
their action to submit to the EEOC relative to those who did not (300 versus 180 days). 29 C.F.R. §
1601.13(a), (b)(2)(ii) (2014).
119. See id. § 1601.18 (establishing the grounds for Commission dismissal of charges).
120. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, FISCAL YEAR 2016 CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 20 tbl.4 (2015), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/2016budget.pdf.
121. Id.at 6 (emphasis added); see also id at 28-29 & chart 2 (reviewing how increased
investigator staff will reduce the backlog inventory of charges).
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(62%) led to reasonable cause determinations. 12 2 With an incredibly
low rate of reasonable cause findings (4%), prophylactic education
efforts can be as profitable as increased enforcement after the fact.
Knowing how few persons with disabilities fully comprehend their
rights under Title 1,123 the extent to which non-frivolous claims
remain under wraps and less meritorious ones arise might be far from
surprising. Either possibility could result simply from employees
failing to recognize what acts and conditions qualify for protection
absent costly legal representation. Empirical findings that, especially
when economic conditions worsen, ADA charges increase and
reasonable cause findings decrease should spur more attentiveness to
informing employees about their civil rights before the next
downturn.
Employers, too, stand to benefit from additional training on their
responsibilities (and corresponding rights) under Title 1. 1 24 Many
firm owners still misperceive the bulk of ADA employment charges
as resulting from discriminatory hiring practices, when they actually
occur after the employee joins the organization. 12 5 Of course,
corrected misperceptions should not encourage lax monitoring at the
hiring stage. Rather, the replacement of stylized facts with hard
evidence about why and when charges tend to arise can prepare
managers to be even more vigilant about their practices during
economic slumps. This lesson is less about shielding employers from
discriminatory allegations in the business cycle valleys than it is
about identifying unlawful decision-making for them at all points in
time. When all labor force participants feel economic pressure, the
EEOC should encourage even more attention to the pitfalls of ADA
violations.
Finally, these data potentially shed light on advancement in broad
perspectives of disability. By no means does this empirical analysis
directly resolve how society views people with impairments, i.e.,
whether the social model of disability has made gains on the medical

122. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF
1990 (ADA) CHARGES (INCLUDES CONCURRENT CHARGES WITH TITLE VII, ADEA, AND EPA) FY 1997FY 2014, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ada-charges.cfm (last visited July 20, 2015).
123. See, e.g., Nancy E. Clarke & Nancy M. Crewe, Stakeholder Attitudes Toward ADA Title I
Development of an Indirect Measurement Method, 43 REHABILITATION COUNSELING BULL. 58 (2000);
Barbara Granger & Paula Gill, Strategiesfor Assisting People with Psychiatric Disabilitiesto Assert
Their ADA Rights and Arrange Job Accommodations, 4 AM. J. PSYCHIATRIC REHABILITATION 120
(2000).
124. See, e.g., Carol Cirka & Elizabeth A. Corrigall, A Case of Ability and Disability: What
Managers Must Know About the ADA, 11 ORG. MGMT. J. 1, 3 (2014) ("Myths and misperceptions about
the ADA and disabled individuals often play a role in employment decisions.").
125. Cf Donohue & Siegelman, ChangingNature, supranote 14, at 984.
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model. 126 Rather, it may be indicative of how employees with
disabilities perceive themselves. The nearly uniform charge submission
coefficients in Table 9, for instance, would seemingly be inconsistent
with differential discrimination against employees by disability type. In
other words, the charge frequency results reflect an important corollary
of the social model: disability is not defined by impairment. The social
model urges an understanding that prevailing attitudes about disability
and the level of willingness to include people with disabilities fully in
civil society are the more critical limitations. 127 Employees with
disabilities were equally likely to allege discrimination during
recessionary periods regardless of their conditions. Empirical findings
of this nature lend support to the idea that disability challenges are social
constructs rather than degrees of impairment.
CONCLUSION

The economic legacy of the ADA, especially Title I's employment
provisions, never coalesced around a consensus narrative twenty-five
years after passage. The reasons likely have to do with the complex
overlap of contributing influences: the role of disability and
unemployment insurance, shifting attitudes about people with
disabilities, and rapidly evolving technologies among them. Continuing
to refine the empirical methods and data brought to bear on this question
will remain important for the statute's continued viability.
Commentators will almost surely assess the ADA's effectiveness by its
production of favorable employment results for workers with disabilities
so long as those gains do not impose excessive costs on employers.
Sound empirical work at the micro-level on wages and employment
levels can enhance that evaluation's credibility.
This Article, however, has joined the chorus of empirical researchers
with
engagement
better employee
to
understand
hoping
antidiscrimination statutes. By tracking the macro-level determinants of
when aggrieved employees seek recourse under Title I, one observes
just how imperative legal process can be during periods of economic
downturn. The foregoing analysis, now replicating similar results for
Title VII litigation, should spur additional interest in employment
discrimination law as a bulwark against personal economic collapse
when employers engage in unlawful decision-making. Although the
data used could not disentangle completely the worker benefit from the
employer damages effects, the stable results for the unemployment rate
126. See supranotes 85-89 and accompanying text.
127. Dimitris Anastasiou & James M. Kauffman, The Social Model of Disability: Dichotomy
Between Impairment and Disability,38 J. MED. & PHIL. 441,442 (2013).
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on the number and success of charges provides strong probative
evidence for the former. I also showed that political economy accounts
of charge patterns carry some explanatory power, especially when
comparing outcomes between Democrat and Republican presidential
administrations. Some support for a legal path dependency hypothesis
emerged, and I found unexpectedly scant evidence for differential
effects by disability type.
An employee-side agenda for students of labor market discrimination
can serve broader policy goals. In particular, many of these findings can
assist federal agencies with ex post implementation endeavors.
Predicting when employees are more likely to come forward with
discrimination allegations, and, eventually, when employees are more
likely to experience discrimination can prepare the government for a
rising tide of charge submissions. Congress should then work with the
President to staff and fund the EEOC at levels necessary to process and
resolve those charges. And, although I found no evidence on average of
differences in EEOC activity by disability type, it is difficult to believe
that outmoded attitudes about various conditions have been corrected
entirely. Individuals subject to additional workplace scrutiny because of
mental or behavioral disabilities no doubt continue to face more
disadvantageous treatment relative to those with more physical
disabilities. Additional, detailed examinations of this phenomenon,
possibly at a highly granular level will provide better guidance to EEOC
investigators and enforcement officials.
The inferences made possible by these rich charge data represent an
initial step toward a more complete picture of appeals to the ADA's
enforcement promises. Future work-linking EEOC charges with
litigation outcomes or probing more pointedly the relationship between
administration priorities and charge resolution-will add clarity to these
broader strokes. Future developments that refine or expand ADA
protections should draw on this systemic view of employee interaction
with the law and its enforcing agency.
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